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I. INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service (Service) has been authorized for over
140 years to pay awards to individuals who blow the whistle on those who
do not pay the taxes they owe. I Paying cash awards to individuals who turn
I Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified by ch. 11, § 3463, 35
Rev. Stat. 686 (1873-74)). Codified as I.R.C. § 7623 (1954). The law as it originally existed
in 1954 referred to those blowing the whistle as informants and payments to informants as
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in delinquent taxpayers has been controversial. During debate of the 1998
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Senator Harry
Reid (D-Nev.) proposed to eliminate the Service whistleblower program,
which he referred to as the "Award for Rats Program" and the "Snitch
Program."' 2 Senator Reid found the idea of the Service paying "snitches" to
rat on their "associates, employers, relatives, and others" as "unseemly,
distasteful, and just wrong." 3 Senator Reid ultimately backed away from his
proposal to eliminate the program and instead agreed to a floor amendment
that required the Service to study and report to Congress about whether the
program should be eliminated or modified.4 Congress did not eliminate the
Service whistleblower program. Instead, eight years later in 2006, Congress
modified the program to boost the Service's authority to pay cash awards to
tax whistleblowers. 5 Congress likely was prompted to retain the Service
whistleblower program because the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration (TIGTA), in a June 2006 audit report, found that the
program had "significantly contributed to the detection and punishment of
tax law violations."' 6 TIGTA also found that the program was more
effective and less expensive than the Service's primary method of selecting
tax returns for audit.7 Lawmakers find appealing programs that enhance

rewards. Id. The most recent changes refer to whistleblowers as whistleblowers and
payments to whistleblowers as awards. I.R.C. § 7623(b). The term "whistleblower" comes
from the act of a British bobby, walking his beat armed only with a nightstick, blowing his
whistle to alert other law enforcement officers of the commission of a crime. Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett J., concurring)
(citing Blowing the Whistle 18 (C. Peters & T. Branch eds. 1972)).
2 144 CONG. REC. S4379-05, at S4397-98 (Statement of Sen. Reid); see also Ralph
Vartabedian, IRS "A wardsfor Snitches" Program Comes Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, April 15,

1998 (referring to whistleblowers as "paid stool pigeons"). Congress passed the Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act (the Act) to make the Service "more
customer friendly" and to protect "taxpayers from abusive practices and procedures of the
IRS." 144 CONG. REc. S4379-05, at S4379-80 (Statement of Sen. Roth describing the main
principles of the Act).
3 144 CONG. REC. S4379-05, at S4398.
4 144 CONG. REc. S4379-05, at S4400; Pub. L. No. 105-206, title III, § 3804, 112 Stat.
783 (July 22, 1998); see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON H.R. 2676, JCX-50-98R (Comm. Print. June 24, 1998).
The Service issued its report in September 1999. IRS, THE INFORMANTS' PROJECT: A STUDY
OF THE PRESENT LAW REWARD PROGRAM, cited in TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX
ADMIN.,

THE INFORMANTS'

REWARD PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

OVERSIGHT (June 2006) n. 13 [hereinafter 2006 TIGTA REPORT].

5 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406, 120 Stat. 2958
(2006) (amending I.R.C. § 7623).
6 2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.

7 2006 TIGTA

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 5. TIGTA determined that the Service
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Service tax enforcement efforts to shrink the tax gap--the difference
between the amount of taxes owed and what is actually
collected-which
8
the Service estimates to be approximately $345 billion.
The 2006 amendments have strengthened certain aspects of the Service
whistleblower program, but the changes are tempered by section 6103,
which provides that returns and return information "shall be confidential"
except as otherwise provided by thirteen statutory exceptions. 9 Section
6103 covers, among other things, tax returns filed with the Service;
schedules and attachments to tax returns; information the Service gathers or
prepares with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of a
person's liability; the identity of taxpayers; the nature, source, or amount of
a taxpayer's income; and whether taxpayers are under investigation or
audit. 10 The definition of return information "has evolved to include
virtually any information collected by the Internal Revenue Service
11
regarding a person's tax liability."
There is a tension between protecting taxpayer privacy and effectively
administering the enhanced Service whistleblower program. Section 6103
generally would prohibit the Service from disclosing to the whistleblower
the status of the whistleblower's claim, including whether the taxpayer is,
has been, or will be under audit as a result of the whistleblower's
information; why a claim is rejected or denied; or the basis of any eventual
award. Furthermore, when Congress enhanced the whistleblower law in
collected more dollars per hour following whistleblower tips than using DIF scores, the
primary method for selecting returns for audit. Id.at 4. DIF stands for Discriminant Index
Function. Id.DIF is a secret mathematical formula that weighs certain return characteristics
to attempt to target high-risk returns. Id.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL
TAX GAP AND

IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (July 8, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/taxgap report_-final version.pdf [hereinafter 2009 TREASURY REPORT]. The

net tax gap--the amount owed after subtracting revenue collected through enforcement
actions and late payments-is estimated to be $290 billion. Id.
9 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2009). Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code as currently in effect.
10 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (defining return); I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (defining return
information). Return information is defined to mean "a taxpayer's identity, the nature,
source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets,
liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax
payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to
other investigation or processing, or any other data received by, recorded by, prepared by,
furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to the determination of the existence,
or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for
any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense .
I..."
1.R.C.
§ 6103(b)(2)(A).
1ILandmark Legal Found. v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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2006, it contemplated that the Service may seek additional assistance from
the whistleblower, presumably to help build a case against the delinquent
taxpayer. 12 The ability of the whistleblower to assist the Service may be
hampered, however, to the extent that section 6103 prohibits the Service
from sharing confidential tax information with the whistleblower. Finally,
the new law gives whistleblowers the right to appeal Service award
determinations to the Tax Court. However, there are questions about how
meaningful that appeal right can be, given the restrictions imposed by
section 6103.
This article examines the tension between the confidentiality provisions
in section 6103 and the Service whistleblower program and attempts to
balance the competing interests of taxpayer privacy and tax administration.
Part II describes the whistleblower program as it existed before the 2006
amendments. Part III describes the 2006 enhancements. Part IV discusses
the section 6103 restrictions, the tension between section 6103 and the
Service whistleblower program, and the shortcomings of existing section
6103 exceptions. Part V recommends that the section 6103 restrictions be
relaxed so that whistleblowers may receive status updates, collaborate with
the Service, and have a meaningful appeal right to the Tax Court. Finally,
Part VI articulates the reasons that justify making disclosures to
whistleblowers.

II. THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM BEFORE THE 2006 AMENDMENTS
The Service has been authorized by statute since as early as 1867 to
pay awards to whistleblowers. 13 But the statute (codified as section 7623 in
1954 and sometimes referred to in this article as the IRS Whistleblower
Act) was underused and, in some respects, ineffective. 14 The Service had
virtually unchecked discretion to decide whether to pay an award at all, as
well as how much, if any, to pay. 15 Section 7623 authorized the Secretary
12 Pub. L. No. 109432, § 406(b)(1)(C), 120 Stat. 2959.
13 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified by ch. 11, § 3463, 35

Rev. Stat. 686 (1873-74)). Codified as I.R.C. § 7623 in 1954.
14 See Dennis J. Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 36364 (Winter 2008) (concluding that the law that was in effect before December 2006 had
"paltry bounties, stingy administrators, inadequate protection for whistleblowers, and
unreceptive courts").
15 I.R.C. § 7623(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a), (c) (as amended in 1998). Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7623-1 applies only to claims under section 7623(a). I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2
I.R.B. 253, § 2; see 2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. Courts consistently held that

section 7623 gave the Service broad discretion to determine whether to pay an award in the
first instance and how much to pay. See, e.g., Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331,
1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Carelli
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of the Treasury, under regulations it prescribed, "to pay such sums.., as he
deems necessary for ... detecting underpayments of tax, or... detecting
and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal
revenue laws." ' 16 The implementing regulations gave district or service
center directors authority to approve awards "in a suitable amount for
information that leads to the detection of underpayments of tax, or the
detection and bringing to trial and punishment of persons guilty of violating
the same.' ' 17 The regulations further provided that "[t]he amount of a
reward will represent what the district or service center director deems to be
18
adequate compensation in the particular case."
Before Congress amended section 7623 in 2006, the Service
administratively provided for a minimum award to a whistleblower of 1%
and a maximum award of 15% of amounts recovered from the person upon
whom the whistle was blown with an absolute cap of $10 million. 19 The
15% award was available for "specific and responsible information that
caused the investigation or, in cases already under audit, materially assisted
in the development of an issue or issues and resulted in the recovery, or was
a direct factor in the recovery." 20 An award of up to 10% of the recovered
amounts was available for "information that caused the investigation or, in
cases already under audit, caused an investigation of an issue or issues, and
21
was of value in the determination of tax liabilities although not specific."
An award of 1% was available for providing "general information that
caused an investigation or investigation of an issue or issues, but had no
direct relationship to the determination of tax liabilities." 22 Essentially, a

v. IRS, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1982); McGrath v. United States, 207 Ct. CI. 978 (Ct. CI.
1975); Saracena v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1334-36 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (stating that the

Service had "complete discretion in the first instance to determine whether an award should
be made and, in the second instance, to fix what, in [its] judgment, amounts to adequate
compensation"); Destefano v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002).
16

I.R.C. § 7623.

17 Treas. Reg. § 301-7623-1(a).
18 Id. § 301.7623-1(c).
19 INTERNAL

REVENUE

SERV.,

PUBLICATION

733,

REWARDS

FOR

INFORMATION

PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct. 2004) [hereinafter IRS

PUBLICATION 733], available at http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2005/p733.pdf, see
I.R.M. § 25.2.2.5 (as in effect in February 2006). The cap was increased from $2 million to
$10 million for payments made after November 7, 2002. S. REP. No. 109-336 (2006). Since
1997, the Service has paid awards from collected proceeds. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub.
L. No. 104-168, § 1209(a), 110 Stat.1473 (1996) (amending the flush language of I.R.C.
§ 7623(a)). Before 1997, the Service used appropriated funds to pay awards.
20 IRS PUBLICATION 733, supra note 19.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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15% award was available if the whistleblower's information directly led to
the recovery, a 10% award was available if the whistleblower's information
indirectly led to the recovery, and a 1% award was available if the
whistleblower's information caused an investigation but was unrelated to
the recovery. 23 An award could exceed 15% of the recovered amounts
if the
24
agreement.
special
a
into
entered
Service and the whistleblower
Decision making was dispersed among multiple Service offices across
the country and there were few standardized procedures to process
whistleblower claims. 25 People who wanted to blow the whistle were
expected to come forward on their own to request an award. The Service
did not advertise its award program; it also instructed its employees not to
solicit or
encourage persons to provide information in exchange for an
6
award.

2

Section 7623 as it existed before the 2006 amendments did not give
whistleblowers the right to judicially appeal Service award determinations.
Instead, judicial review potentially existed under the Tucker Act. 27 The
Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear contract
claims against the United States in excess of $10,000. 28 A whistleblower
could properly file suit to challenge an award or the denial of an award
23

2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.

24

Id.

25

2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 n.7 (stating that whistleblower claims were

handled at five different Service campuses).
26 I.R.M. § 25.2.1.4 (as in effect before 2006 changes); I.R.M. § 25.2.2.3 (as in effect
February 2006) (stating that "[a]n internal revenue employee receiving information from an
informant should neither suggest nor encourage the whistleblower to submit a claim for
reward"). Perhaps tax whistleblowing is objectionable if the Service is viewed as a taxcollection agency and not a law-enforcement agency; see Confidentiality of Tax Return
Information: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong. 129 (1976)
(statement of Sheldon Cohen, former Service Comm'r).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2008); see Abraham v. United States, 81 Fed. Cl. 178, 184
(2008) ("to establish an implied-in-fact contract with the United States, Plaintiff must
establish consideration, mutuality of intent, definiteness of terms, and authority of the
official whose conduct is relied upon to bind the Government"); Dacosta v. United States, 82
Fed. Cl. 549, 556 (2008); cf Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(stating that it was "an open question whether an agency's denial of a discretionary award is
reviewable at all"). The Federal Circuit in Krug upheld the Court of Federal Claims decision
that the Service's refusal to make an award to Krug was not an abuse of discretion because
no contract existed between Krug and the Service. Id. Thus, while the court questioned
whether judicial review was appropriate at all, it decided that "such review was at most
harmless error" because the Service's decision was upheld. Id.
28 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2008). The federal district courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims over contract claims of $10,000 or less. 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2009).
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under the Tucker Act by establishing that there was a contract with the
Service governing the award. 29 However, courts have consistently held that
30
Service administrative guidelines do not themselves create a contract.
Rather, Publication 733, which set forth the 1% minimum award and the
15% maximum award, was merely the government's invitation to the
whistleblower to make an offer. 3 1 Even when the Service collected a
specific amount from a delinquent taxpayer, the whistleblower could not
bind the Service to the award percentages in Publication 733. 32
The Court of Federal Claims reviewed challenges to Service
determinations under an abuse of discretion standard of review. 33 To
prevail, a whistleblower had to prove that the Service abused its discretion
34
by acting arbitrarily and unreasonably in making or denying an award.
Krug v. United States illustrates the no-win situation for whistleblowers
under the law in effect before the 2006 amendments. 35 Krug, the
whistleblower, provided information that caused the Service to initiate an
investigation that resulted in the recovery of millions of dollars from
delinquent taxpayers. 36 The Service denied Krug any award, citing the
following three reasons in a form letter: (1) the amount recovered was too
small to warrant an award; (2) the Service already had the information or
the information was publicly available; and (3) the information furnished

29 See, e.g., Conner v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 86 (2007) (Court of Federal Claims

had no subject matter jurisdiction because whistleblower had no contract with the Service);
Conway v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 572, 573 (2003) (stating that court has jurisdiction over
whistleblower's breach of contract claim based on a written contract entered into between
the whistleblower and the Service that obligated the Service to pay 10% of any taxes
collected).
30 See, e.g., Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
31 Krug, 168 F.3d at 1309. ("[l]n Publication 733 and pursuant to section 7623 and the
regulation, the Government invites offers for a reward; [t]he informant makes an offer by his
conduct; and the Government accepts the offer by agreeing to pay a specific sum.").
32 Cambridge, 558 F.3d at 1336. Cambridge provided information to the Service that
led to the collection of tax from her ex-husband. Id. at 1333. The Service collected
$371,709.12 and paid Cambridge $4560.54. Id. at 1337 (Newman J., dissenting). Cambridge
sought an additional payment of $6906.55, based on the formula provided in Publication
733. Id. at 1335. Although the Service had paid Cambridge some amount of an award, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of Federal Claims' dismissal of Cambridge's suit,
concluding that she failed to show any enforceable contract. Id. at 1336.
33 See, e.g., Lagermeier v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 758, 760 (1977) (citing Saracena,
508 F.2d at 1334-36).
34 Saracena, 508 F.2d at 1334 (holding that the whistleblowers had not met their
burden of showing no rational basis for the Service's determination).
35 Krug v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 96 (1998), af'd, 168 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
36 Krug, 41 Fed. Cl. at 97.
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did not cause an investigation. 37 The information in the form letter was
pretext, but the Service asserted that section 6103 prevented it from
disclosing the true reasons. 38 The court saw through the pretext saying that:
Government counsel ultimately acknowledged that the IRS used
the information plaintiff provided to make cases against the
taxpayers, that it did not have the information available otherwise,
and that it recovered "millions and millions" of dollars in taxes
and penalties as a result of plaintiffs information. The
Government then gave plaintiff inapplicable possible reasons for
denying his claim for reward on the basis that the real reason could
not be revealed because of taxpayer
privacy laws. The reasons do
39
not affect taxpayer privacy at all.

Nonetheless, the Court of Federal Claims held that the Service did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to pay Krug an award. 40 Krug failed to
provide any factual allegations to establish that the Service abused its
discretion, presumably because section 6103 prevented
him from obtaining
41
the true reasons behind the denial of his claim.
The outcome in Krug was not an anomaly. While few whistleblowers
filed suit to challenge their award determinations, those who did had little
success. Professor Terri Gutierrez determined that the Service won every
one of the nineteen cases that whistleblowers filed to challenge awards from
1941 to 1998."
III. THE RECONSTRUCTED WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM

A. Summary of Section 7623(b)
Congress strengthened the Service whistleblower program in 2006 by
adding subsection (b) to section 7623 for information that a whistleblower
provides to the Service on or after December 20, 2006. 43 Section 7623(b)
37 Id.
38 Id. at 98.
31 Id. at 99.
40 Id. at 98-99. The Service reviewed documents in camera to determine whether the

Service abused its discretion. Id. at 98.
41
42

Id. at 98-99.
Terri Gutierrez, IRS Informants Reward Program: Is it Fair?,84 TAx NoTEs 1203

(Aug. 23, 1999). Professor Gutierrez reported that there were 95,105 whistleblower claims
filed from 1989 to 1998. Id. at 1205 tbl.1. The Service paid awards in 6310 of those claims.
Id.
43 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, Div. A, Title IV,
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applies only if the amounts in dispute, including penalties and interest,
exceed $2 million and, if the taxpayer is an individual, the taxpayer's gross
income must exceed $200,000 for any taxable year at issue. 4 4 The Service
whistleblower law as it was before the 2006 amendments continues to exist
in section 7623(a). 45 Section 7623(a) applies to claims that do not meet the
section 7623(b) thresholds
and to information submitted before the new law
46
effective.
became
Congress, in an off-Code provision, established the Service
Whistleblower Office to administer the whistleblower program. 47 Stephen
Whitlock was named as the first director of the Whistleblower Office in
February 2007. 48 Congress directed Treasury to issue guidance to
implement the revised whistleblower program. 49 Treasury has not yet
promulgated regulations under section 7623(b), but has issued interim
guidance in Notice 2008-4.50 Other off-Code provisions permit the Service,
in its sole discretion, to ask the whistleblower for additional assistance and
require Treasury to report to Congress each year about the use5 1of section
7623, including legislative and administrative recommendations.
The 2006 amendments raised the maximum potential award to 30% of
the recovered amounts and removed the $10 million cap. 52 The minimum
§ 406(d), 120 Stat. 2960; Wolf v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.M. (CCH) 1273 (T.C. 2007)
(stating that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over a whistleblower claim under section
7623(b) if the information was provided to the Service before December 20, 2006).
I.R.C. § 7623(b)(5)(B).
45 I.R.C. § 7623(a).
44

Id. The 2006 amendments do not apply to supplemental information provided after
December 20, 2006 unless the Service takes administrative or judicial action that it would
not otherwise have taken on the basis of earlier-supplied information alone. I.R.S. Notice
2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, § 3.12.
47 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(b). An off-Code provision is found
only in the enacting legislation rather than in the Internal Revenue Code itself.
48 I.R.S. News Release IR-2007-25 (Feb. 2, 2007).
49 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(b).
50 I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253.
51 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(b), (c) (permitting the Service to seek
assistance from the whistleblower under § 406(b) and requiring annual reports to Congress
under § 406(c)). The 2008 report was issued in June 2008. IRS, 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (June 24, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER
REPORT], availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblowerannual_
report.pdf. In September 2009, the Whistleblower Office issued a report to Congress
46

covering the fiscal year ending September 30, 2008. IRS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE USE OF SECTION 7623 (September 2009) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2008
WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual_

report to congressseptember 2009.pdf.
52 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).
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award amount under the new law generally is 15%, which is the maximum
award amount under the pre-2006 law set forth in section 7623(a). 5 3 The
award is reduced to 10% if the claim is based principally on already
publicly disclosed information unless the whistleblower was the original
source of that information. 54 A whistleblower is entitled to an award out of
the recovered proceeds only if the whistleblower's information causes the
55
Service to initiate an administrative or judicial action against the taxpayer.
The specific amount of an award within the statutorily-mandated ranges
depends on the extent to which the whistleblower's
information
• .
• 56
substantially contributed to the Service's investigation. Even a person
who planned and initiated the actions that led to the underpayment (for
example, a promoter or tax advisor) may be entitled
to an award unless that
57
role.
her
or
his
for
crime
a
of
convicted
is
person
The 2006 amendments to the IRS Whistleblower Act in many respects
model the 1986 amendments to the federal False Claims Act. With the
exception of tax claims, which are expressly excluded, the False Claims Act
authorizes private citizens known as qui tam plaintiffs to file actions on
behalf of the United States against persons who defraud the federal
government. 59 The qui tam plaintiff initiates the process by filing a
53 Id.
54 Id. § 7623(b)(2).

" Id. § 7623(b)(1).
56

Id.

" Id. § 7623(b)(3).
58 Senator Charles Grassley, while chair of the Senate Finance Committee, sponsored
the 2006 changes to the IRS Whistleblower Act. Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Praises
IRS's Quick Action on Whistleblower Program,2007 TNT 24-69 (Feb. 2, 2007) (stating that
Grassley authored the 2006 changes to the IRS Whistleblower Act). Senator Grassley also
was a key sponsor of the 1986 amendments to the federal False Claims Act. JAMES T.

QuI TAM ACTIONs: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC
POLICY 154 (Roger Clegg & James L.J. Nuzzo eds., National Legal Center for the Pub.
Interest 1996) (identifying Senator Grassley as one of the principal sponsors of the 1986
Amendments). Amendments were proposed to the IRS Whistleblower Act in 2004, but the
legislation was not enacted until 2006. See S. 1637, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 488 (2004). The
2004 proposal applied to claims if the amount in dispute exceeded $20,000 and gross income
exceeded $200,000 if the allegedly delinquent taxpayer was an individual. Id. The 2004
proposal also required assistance by whistleblowers to be provided pursuant to a tax
BLANCH ET AL., CITIZEN Surrs AND

administration contract and permitted the Whistleblower Office to reimburse the
whistleblower's legal counsel from collected proceeds. Id. Under the 2004 proposal, claims
could be appealed to the Tax Court, but the small-case procedures described in section 7463
would have applied, which would have precluded appeals of Tax Court decisions. Id.
Finally, the 2004 proposal referred to section 7461(b)(1), which permits the Tax Court to
make any provision to protect confidential information including sealing the record. Id.
59 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. When Congress revised the False Claims Act in 1986, it
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complaint under seal in Sthe60federal district court where the defendant
resides or transacts business. The government has at least sixty days to
decide whether to intervene in the suit.6 1 If the government intervenes, it
has primary responsibility for prosecuting the action, but the qui tam
plaintiff has the right to continue to be a party. 62 If the government declines
63
to intervene, the qui tam plaintiff has the right to conduct the litigation.
The qui tam plaintiff generally is entitled to between 15% and 30% of any
amounts recovered, depending on the extent to which she contributed to the
case and whether or not the government intervened. 64 If the suit is based on
publicly available information, the qui tam plaintiffs share may be limited
to 10% of any recovery. 65 A lower percentage may also be awarded to a qui
tam plaintiff who planned and initiated the underlying action upon which
the case is brought. 66 A qui tam plaintiff convicted 67
of criminal conduct
award.
any
to
entitled
not
is
role
her
or
his
from
arising

permitted so-called reverse false claims (using a false record to decrease an obligation to the
government), but expressly excluded tax claims. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(G) (defining a
false claim to include reverse false claims), 3729(d) (excluding tax claims); see also I.R.C.
§ 7401 (providing that "no civil action for the collection or recovery of taxes, or of any fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, shall be commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or sanctions the
proceedings

and the Attorney

General or his delegate

directs

that the action be

commenced").
The term "qui tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who pursues this action on our Lord
the King's behalf as well as for his own." Roco v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 160, 168 (T.C.
2003).
Six states permit citizens to bring qui tam actions for tax fraud. John A. Bruegger, Tax
Whistleblower Proceedingsat the State Level: Common Themes and a Call to Action, 19 J.
MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES 13, 16-22 (May 2009) (discussing false claims acts of
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, and Rhode Island).
60 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(2), 3732(a) (2006).
61 Id. § 3730(b)(4). The complaint remains sealed and is not served on the defendant
while the government is investigating the claim. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
62 Id. § 3730(c).
63 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
64 Id. § 3730(d). If the government intervenes, the qui tam plaintiff generally may
receive 15% to 25% of amounts recovered. Id. § 3730(d)(1). If the government does not
intervene, the qui tam plaintiff generally may receive 25% to 30% of amounts recovered. Id.
§ 3730(d)(2).
61 Id. § 3730(d)(1). The plaintiff must be the original source of the publicly disclosed
information for the court to have jurisdiction over a qui tam suit based on publicly disclosed
information. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). Otherwise, the suit must be brought by the Attorney
General. Id.
' Id. § 3730(d)(3).
67 id.
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While there are certain similarities between the federal False Claims
Act and the IRS Whistleblower Act, there are some significant differences.
One key difference is the extent of the whistleblower's involvement. The
False Claims Act promotes a "working partnership" between the qui tam
plaintiff and the government by effectively deputizing private citizens to
prosecute fraud against the federal government as full participating parties
in the litigation, whether or not the government intervenes. 68 By contrast, a
person blowing the whistle under the IRS Whistleblower Act has the right
to merely report his or her claim, but not the right to prosecute it. A
whistleblower cannot compel the Service to investigate a claim. Nor may a
whistleblower take up a private cause of action under the IRS
Whistleblower Act if the Service declines to pursue an investigation. 69 The
Service has total discretion to decide whether to pursue a whistleblower
claim in the first instance and the extent of the whistleblower's
involvement. Unlike whistleblowers proceeding under the False Claims
Act, a tax whistleblower has a seat at the table only if invited by the
Service.
A second key difference is that the courts are involved in False Claims
Act cases from the time a whistleblower complaint is filed, whereas claims
under the IRS Whistleblower Act are primarily administrative proceedings
with little judicial involvement. 70 Once a False Claims Act whistleblower
files a complaint, the government may dismiss the case only after the court
provides the whistleblower a hearing. 71 Likewise, the government may
settle a False Claims Act case only after the court holds a hearing and
determines that the proposed settlement is "fair, adequate, and reasonable
under all the circumstances." 72 By contrast, the Service may settle a claim
with a taxpayer without any input from the whistleblower, and until the
2006 amendments, tax whistleblowers usually could not judicially appeal
73
Service award determinations.
68 Frederick M. Morgan, Jr. & Jennifer M. Verkamp, Notes from the Field:

Practicalitiesof the Qui Tam "Working Partnership" Under the 1986 False Claims Act
Amendments, 29 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & Qul TAM Q. REv 11, 11 (Jan. 2003) (quoting 132
Cong. Rec. 29315, 29321-22, Oct. 7, 1986).
69 Scholars have recommended that qui tam actions be permitted for tax claims. Joshua
D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, andHow We Can Make
Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 205-219 (Fall 1996); Ventry, supra note 14, at 370-90.
70 An Interview with IRS Whistleblower Office DirectorStephen A. Whitlock, 52 FALSE
CLAIMS ACT & Qul TAM Q. REv. 79, 81 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter Whitlock Interview]

(describing the Service's process as a "closed process, which the whistleblower does not
have a vote in").
71 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
72 Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
73 See supra note 27.
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A third key difference is that recovery under the False Claims Act
requires proving that the defendant has defrauded the government. Fraud is
not a prerequisite to recovery under the IRS Whistleblower Act. 74 Tax
whistleblowers may recover from taxpayers' innocent mistakes or
75
uncertainty in the tax laws.
The enhanced IRS Whistleblower Act is described as a mandatory
program because section 7623(b)(1) provides that a whistleblower "shall"
receive an award if the whistleblower's information causes the Service to
investigate the taxpayer. 76 The new law is mandatory in the sense that the
Service now generally must pay whistleblowers a minimum award of 15%
of the proceeds collected from an administrative or judicial action initiated
based on information from the whistleblower. 77 However, many aspects of
the Service whistleblower program remain discretionary. First, the Service
must decide whether to begin an administrative or judicial proceeding
against the taxpayer based on information that the whistleblower
provides. 78 Second, assuming the Service proceeds with an investigation
based on the whistleblower's information, the Service has discretion to
determine the percentage of the collected proceeds to award the
whistleblower based on the value of the information provided. 79 Section
7623 provides no guidelines for deciding whether to initiate an action or
how to value the whistleblower's information. Just as before the 2006
changes, the Service continues to have discretion to decide whether to
pursue the taxpayer and the amount of any whistleblower award.
Notwithstanding weaknesses in the enhanced whistleblower law, it has
increased the quantity and quality of claims. From October 2007 until the
74 Whitlock Interview, supra note 70.

75 See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? UnderstandingTax Law's Uncertainty, 157
U. PA. L. REv. 1017, 1033-34 (2009) (describing the impact of judicial doctrines, such as
economic substance and business purpose, to validate or invalidate tax shelter transactions
ex post by the courts); Ventry, supra note 14, at 370-71 (noting that federal tax law
"contains countless unknown outcomes" where the "'right' answer is ambiguous at best");
see also David B. Blair, George M. Clarke III, & Brian A. Hill, Tax Whistleblowers:
Prevention and Mitigation of Costs Associated With Meritless Claims, 60 TAx EXECUTIVE
351, 351 (Fall 2008) (discussing the ability to recover from a whistleblower claim where a
corporation received a "should" opinion, the Service audits the corporation, and the company
decides to settle based on the hazards of litigation).
76 See, e.g., 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supranote 51, at 2.

77 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1).
78 Id.
79 Id.

80 "To provide some transparency," the Whistleblower Office intends to develop
criteria to assist in making determinations on award eligibility and award percentages. 2008
WHSTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51, at 5.
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end of September 2008, the Service had received 476 submissions relating
to 1246 taxpayers that apparently met the $2 million threshold. 81 Of those,
228 allege an underpayment of $10 million or more and 64 allege an
underpayment of $100 million or more. 82 One claim is for $4.4 billion,
reported to be the largest claim ever submitted. 83 Under the prior
whistleblower law, "only 12 of 227 full paid claims in 2007 involved
collections of more than84$2 million, and only 3 [sic] involved collections of
more than $10 million."
Congress amended section 7623 in 2006 to encourage insiders to blow
the whistle on persons who are not paying their taxes. 85 Higher claim
submission rates provide some indication that section 7623(b) is having its
intended effect. One recent high-profile whistleblower claim involves
Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS banker, who blew the whistle on UBS's
role in offshore tax shelters. 86 UBS was fined $780 million and agreed to
turn over the names of wealthy Americans who participated in illegal
shelters. 87 Birkenfeld, who was sentenced to forty months in prison after
pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States for
helping a client evade U.S. tax, is seeking to share in the $780 million fine
paid by UBS as well as amounts that the Service collects from shelter
participants who are audited. 88 Heinrich Kieber, a former employee at LGT
from
Group, a Liechtenstein bank, is also seeking a whistleblower award
89
the Service for providing information about tax shelter investors.

81

FISCAL YEAR 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER

REPORT,

supra note 51, at 7-8. The number of

claims surged 1000% from 2007. Stephen Ohlemacher, Tips on Tax Cheats Skyrocket With
Bigger Rewards, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 1, 2009.
82 FISCAL YEAR 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51, at 8. TIGTA reports
that the whistleblower claims submitted during calendar year 2008 allege more than $65
billion of unreported income. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REF. No. 200930-114, DEFICIENCIES EXIST INTHE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER
CLAIMS 1 (Aug. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 TIGTA REPORT], available at

http://www.ustreas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930114fr.pdf.
83 Jeremiah Coder, Law Firm Submits New Record Whistle-Blower Claim, 2008 TNT
116-1 (June 16, 2008).
84 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51, at 4-5.
85 id. at 1-2.

86 Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Tax Evasion: Banker Who Blew Whistle on UBS Seeks
Awardfrom IRS, Attorney Says, 199 DAILY TAx REPORT K-I (Oct. 19, 2009).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Lynnley Browning, Banking Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14,
2008, at C8.

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 29:447

In 2007, Congress considered several amendments to section 7623.90
One of these amendments sought to reduce the $2 million threshold to
$20,000. 9 1 Another proposed amendment sought to reimburse the lawyers
92
of whistleblowers for their costs in providing assistance to the Service.
Third, the Tax Court would have been permitted to adopt rules to permit
whistleblower appeals to be closed to the public and to prohibit public
inspection of whistleblower filings and evidence. 93 Fourth, amendments
proposed in 2007 would have codified the 2006 off-Code provisions. None
94
of these provisions were enacted.
B. Proceduresfor Filing Claims with the Whistleblower Office
A person seeking an award under the IRS Whistleblower Act must
submit IRS Form 211, Application for Award for OriginalInformation to
the Whistleblower Office and include attachments that describe "specific
[facts] and credible information" concerning the alleged tax violation, the
relationship between the whistleblower and the taxpayer, and the amount
that the taxpayer owes. 95 A whistleblower proceeding under section
7623(b) cannot submit his or her award request anonymously or using an
96
alias because the request must be signed under penalties of perjury.
Although whistleblowers must reveal their true identity in their award
request, the Whistleblower Office promises to protect
the whistleblower's
97
privilege.
informer
law
identity using its common
90 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Health, & Iraq Accountability Act, H.R. 1591,
110th Cong. § 543(c) (1st Sess. 2005).
91 Id. § 543(a).
92 Id. § 543(c).
93 Id.

94 Both houses of Congress passed the legislation, but the President vetoed it and
Congress failed to override the President's veto. OFF. OF THE CLERK OF THE H. OF REP.,
105TH

CONGR.,

FINAL

VOTE

RESULTS

FOR

ROLL

CALL

276,

available

at

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2007/rol1276.xml.
95 I.R.S Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, § 3.03.
96 Id. at § 3.03(9).
97 Id. at § 3.06. The purpose of the Service informer privilege is to encourage members
of the public to come forward and disclose information they have regarding a person's
alleged noncompliance with the internal revenue laws. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 59 (1957). The government's informer privilege is not absolute; it may be overridden if
the public's interest in protecting the whistleblower is outweighed by an individual's right to
receive a fair determination. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61; Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 67
T.C. 672, 676 (1977) (discussing balance that court must make between public's interest in
protecting whistleblower's identity and individual's right to prepare a defense). The Service
recognizes that it may not always be possible to protect the identity of the whistleblower,
particularly if the whistleblower is needed as a witness in a judicial proceeding. I.R.S. Notice

20101
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The Whistleblower Office conducts an initial review to reject claims
that it deems meritless or that do not satisfy the section 7623(b) statutory
thresholds (disputed amounts exceeding $2 million and gross income in
98
excess of $200,000 if the allegedly delinquent taxpayer is an individual).
The Whistleblower Office also determines whether a fraud referral should
be made to the Criminal Investigation Division.9 9 Claims that are not
rejected and not referred for criminal investigation are sent to subject matter
experts at Service operating divisions for evaluation.100 The subject matter
expert handling the claim debriefs the whistleblower and makes a
determination about whether to pursue the claim. 10 1 Claims that the Service
decides not to pursue are returned to the Whistleblower
Office. 102 Claims
103
examination.
for
forwarded
that will be pursued are
At the end of the examination, there will be two files-a case file,
which is used for case processing, and an award claim file, which is sent to
10 4
the Whistleblower Office to assist in making an award determination.
Documentation to be part of the award claim file includes copies of
examined returns, portions of the revenue agent's report that reflect the
issues impacted by the whistleblower's information, a schedule of
adjustments, copies of the information provided by the whistleblower, and
any other information that may assist the Whistleblower Office in making a
determination. 10 5 The Whistleblower Office will determine the amount, if

2008-4, § 3.06, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, 255. It is uncertain whether a whistleblower's identity
will remain confidential if the whistleblower appeals his or her award determination to the
Tax Court because the Tax Court rules require the petitioner's name on pleadings and other
documents filed with the Court. TAX CT. R. 341(b)(1). Nonetheless, the Court has permitted
a petitioner in at least one case to proceed anonymously. Anonymous v. Commissioner, 127
T.C. 89 (2006). The Tax Court recognizes that while it is not required to permit all
whistleblowers to proceed anonymously it may on a case-by-case basis permit a
whistleblower "to proceed anonymously.., when appropriate." Press Release, U.S. Tax
Court (Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/100308.pdf.
98 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51, at 3, 8.
99 I.R.M. § 25.2.2.6(l) (2008).

100 I.R.M. § 25.2.2.6(2); see Memorandum for all LMSB Industry Directors from Frank
Y. Ng, Commissioner LMSB, LMSB-4-0508-033 (July 21, 2008) (on file with author). In a

report issued in August 2009, TIGTA determined that there were significant delays in the
processing of whistleblower claims. 2009 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 82, at 11.
101 I.R.M. § 25.2.2.6(5), (6).
102 Id. § 25.2.2.6(6)(a).
103 Id. § 25.2.2.6.
104 Id. § 25.2.2.6(9).
105 Id. § 25.2.2.6(10).
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any, of the award, and will notify the whistleblower in writing of its
determination. 106
C. Summary of the New Tax CourtAppeal Right
1. Procedures for Filing Appeals
Whistleblowers who file claims under section 7623(b) (but not under
section 7623(a)) have the right to appeal their award determinations to the
Tax Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction. 107 A whistleblower
commences an action in the Tax Court by filing a petition containing,
among other things: the whistleblower's name and address; an explanation
of why the whistleblower disagrees with the Whistleblower Office's
determination; and the facts that the whistleblower relies on to support his
or her position. 10 8 To be timely, appeals to the Tax Court must be made
within thirty days of the determination. 109 A contract is no longer a
prerequisite to obtaining judicial review of a Service whistleblower
determination. 110
2.

Which Determinations Are Appealable?

Section 7623(b)(4) provides that "[a]ny determination regarding an
award under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may, within 30 days of such
determination, be appealed to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall have
jurisdiction with respect to such matter)."' I Paragraph (1) directs the
payment of an award to the whistleblower of 15% to 30% of amounts
recovered from the taxpayer if the Service proceeds with an administrative
112
or judicial action based on information from the whistleblower.
Paragraph (2) reduces the amount of the award from paragraph (1) to no
more than 10% if the whistleblower was not the original source of the
Id. §§ 25.2.2.6(11)-(12), 25.2.2.13(1) (2008).
107 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4); see Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. CI.
549, 555 (2008)
(stating that the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over section 7623(b) claims).
108 TAX CT.R. 340-341.
109 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4). A whistleblower claim that is filed in the
Court of Federal
Claims cannot be transferred to the Tax Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Dacosta, 82 Fed. Cl.
at 557. Section 1631 permits the Court of Federal Claims and other courts identified in 28
U.S.C. § 610 to transfer cases among themselves in the "interest of justice" if the claim is
filed in a court that lacks jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2009). The Tax Court is not one of
the courts identified in 28 U.S.C. § 610.
110I.R.C. § 7623(b)(6)(A).
III Id.§ 7623(b)(4).
112 Id. § 7623(b)(1).
106

2010]

Whistling Dixie

information. 1 13 Paragraph (3) reduces the amount of the award from
paragraph (1) in cases where the whistleblower planned or initiated the
underlying action upon which the investigation against the taxpayer is
brought. 114 When read together, paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) seem to
mean that whistleblower claims may be appealed to the Tax Court only if
the Service actually proceeds with an administrative or judicial action. This
results because paragraph (1) is operative only after an administrative or
judicial action, and paragraphs (2) and (3) modify paragraph (1). 115 Under
that interpretation, a determination by the Service to decline to take any
action based on a whistleblower's information would not be appealable.
Also, claims that lack merit, or those that are not processed or rejected by
the Whistleblower Office because they are not administratively perfected
116
would not be appealable.
If an appeal right is available only after an administrative or judicial
action, there likely will be disputes about what constitutes an administrative
action or a judicial action. Section 7623 does not define the phrase
"administrative or judicial action" and Treasury has not provided any
guidance interpreting the phrase. Nonetheless, there should be little doubt
that an administrative action has begun once the Service sends the taxpayer
an initial contact letter and Publication 1, Your Rights as a Taxpayer.1 17 If
the Service takes that action based on information from the whistleblower,
1 18
the whistleblower is entitled to an award out of any collected proceeds.
But suppose the Service analyzes a taxpayer's return based on a
whistleblower's tip and then decides not to proceed any further. If the
Service's preliminary analysis constitutes an administrative action within
the meaning of section 7623(b), the Service would have to issue a
determination denying an award, and section 7623(b)(4) would permit the
Id. § 7623(b)(2).
114 Id. § 7623(b)(3).
115 See TAX CT. R. 341(b)(2) (determination of an award is what is appealable);
113

Whitlock Interview, supra note 70 (determination of amount of award, not whether to initiate
an administrative or judicial proceeding, is what is appealable).
116 I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, § 3.04, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, 255 (discussing reasons to reject
whistleblower claims); see also FISCAL YEAR 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51,
at 4-5 (stating that "[tihe whistleblower ... may not appeal or otherwise challenge an IRS
tax administration decision").
117 See I.R.M. §§ 4.10.2.7.4.1, 4.10.2.7.4.2. But see Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d
S111 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an audit is not an administrative proceeding for purposes
of section 6103(h)(4)). Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mallas, the Service
and other courts have concluded that audits are administrative proceedings for purposes of
section 6103(h)(4). See, e.g., I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice 2006-006 (Nov. 22, 2005) and
cases cited therein.
118 I.R.C. § 7623(b); see I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, § 3.07, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, 255.
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whistleblower to appeal that determination by filing a petition with the Tax
Court within thirty days of the determination."19 A similar issue arises if the
Service conducts an audit based on information from the whistleblower but
ultimately agrees to accept the taxpayer's return as filed, making no
changes to the taxpayer's reported tax liability. The whistleblower would
not be entitled to an award because no proceeds will be collected from the
taxpayer. Nonetheless, the whistleblower should receive a determination
from the Whistleblower Office denying an award. That determination
should be appealable to the Tax Court because the Service did in fact
proceed with an administrative action based on the whistleblower's
information.
Other concerns arise if the taxpayer is already under Service audit
when the whistleblower blows the whistle. In that case, a determination has
to be made about whether the Service proceeded with an administrative or
judicial action based on the whistleblower's information. The Service has
said that the whistleblower's information generally will not be regarded as
resulting in administrative or judicial action if it does not change
how the
20
resolved.
or
approached
be
will
issues in the existing proceeding
3.

Scope of Review

Section 7623 does not address the scope of review applicable to
whistleblower appeals to the Tax Court. 1 2 1 Scope of review .refers
•• 122 to the
A de
span of evidence the court will consider in reaching its decision.
novo scope of review means that the Tax Court will make its decision by
creating a new evidentiary record, considering evidence such as records and
testimony..that
123 the Service did not consider during the administrative
proceeding.
An administrative record or abuse of discretion scope of
119 No award would be owing because the Service would have no collected proceeds
from which to pay a whistleblower award. I.R.C. § 7623(b).
120

IRS Notice 2008-4, § 3.07, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253, 255.

121 Section 7623 is also silent regarding the standard of review that should apply to
whistleblower award determinations. Jeremiah Coder, Private Claimant Suits Might Inform
Future Whistle-Blower Cases, 122 TAx NoTEs 332 (Jan. 12, 2009). Standard of review refers
to how the court will examine the evidence. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 32, 56 (2004)
(Halpern, J. & Holmes, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.
2006). Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, the Tax Court will overturn the
Service's determination only if the petitioner is able to show that the Service's determination

was "arbitrary, capricious, clearly unlawful, or without sound basis in fact or law." Ewing,
122 T.C. at 39. By contrast, a reviewing court applying a de novo standard of review gives
little deference to the original decision maker's determinations.
122Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 126 (2008) (Vasquez, J., concurring).
123 Ewing, 122 T.C. at 56.
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the
review, on the other hand, would limit the Tax Court to reviewing 124
determination.
award
the
making
in
considered
Service
the
evidence that
There is a reasonable argument that the same scope of review that
applies to collection due process (CDP) cases should apply to tax
whistleblower cases. Congress, as part of the 1998 Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act, gave taxpayers the right to CDP
hearings to administratively challenge the Service's filing of a tax lien and
the Service's intent to levy on the taxpayer's property.125 Congress gave the
Tax Court jurisdiction to hear appeals of CDP determinations by providing
in section 6330(d) that "[t]he person may, within 30 days of a determination
under this section, appeal such determination to the Tax Court (and the Tax
Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)." Section 7623(b)
provides that "[a]ny determination regarding an award... may, within 30
days of such determination, be appealed to the Tax Court (and the Tax
Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)." Because the
language from the CDP provision in section 6330(d) is almost identical to
the whistleblower provision in section 7623(b), it is reasonable to assume
provision be interpreted in
that Congress intended that the whistleblower
126
provision.
CDP
the
as
manner
same
the
Even if one agrees that the same scope of review applies to CDP cases
and whistleblower cases, the matter is not resolved because the scope of
review for CDP cases remains unsettled. A divided Tax Court in Robinette
v. Commissioner applied a de novo scope of review, meaning that the Tax
Court could gather evidence
. .• outside
.. 127 the administrative record during the
The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax
appeal of the CDP determination.
Court's decision in Robinette, holding that the scope of review is limited to
the administrative record pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act's
"record rule." 128 The First Circuit also has held that the record rule limits
the Tax Court's review to the administrative record in CDP cases.129

124Bryan T.Camp, The Failureof the AdversarialProcess in the Administrative State,
84 IN.L. J. 57, 90 (2009) (referring to record review as "adversary process lite").
125Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 3401, 112 Stat. 685 (codified as I.R.C. §§ 6230, 6330).
126 See Ewing, 122 T.C. at 38 (citing several relevant cases).
127Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85, 94 (2004), rev'd, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.
2006).
128 Robinette, 439 F.3d at 461.

129Murphy v. Commissioner, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (abuse of discretion scope
of review in Tax Court); Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 155 (1st Cir. 2005) (abuse of
discretion scope of review in CDP appeals to District Court); see also Living Care
Alternatives of Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2005) (in appeal from District
Court, abuse of discretion standard and scope of review applies).
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Section 706 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies an
abuse of discretion scope of review for proceedings before non-Article III
courts. 13 The Tax Court is a non-Article III court, but it does not consider
itself subject to the APA. 13 1 Even after the Eighth Circuit's reversal in
Robinette and the First Circuit's decision in Olsen, the Tax Court has not
given up its position that a de novo scope of review may be appropriate in
132
CDP cases.
Whistleblower cases and CDP cases that do not involve a challenge to
the existence or amount of tax owed are nondeficiency cases. Comparing
the language Congress used in section 7330(d) and section 7623(b) to the
language used regarding deficiency cases supports the argument that an
abuse of discretion scope of review is appropriate for whistleblower and
CDP cases. Section 6213(a) permits taxpayers to petition the Tax Court for
a "redetermination" of a deficiency determined by the Service. Section
6214(a) gives the Tax Court jurisdiction to "redetermine" the amount of a
deficiency. The Tax Court applies a de novo scope of review to deficiency
determinations governed by sections 6213 and 6214.133 The argument is
that Congress intended for the Tax Court to apply an abuse of discretion
scope of review to CDP cases and whistleblower cases because Congress
intentionally refrained from using the words "determine" or "redetermine"
134
in the whistleblower and CDP statutes.
Problems inevitably will arise if an abuse of discretion scope of review
applies and the administrative record is underdeveloped or is otherwise
inadequate. 35 The Service has had an unimpressive record of maintaining

130 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
131The Tax Court is an Article I court. Deficiency cases that the Tax Court hears are
not subject to the APA. See, e.g., O'Dwyer v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir.
1959).
132Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 115, 120 n.6 (2008) (stating that "[n]o inference
should be drawn that, by distinguishing Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir.
2006), we are changing our position in lien and levy cases as expressed in [the Tax Court's
decision in Robinette]."). Some commentators have suggested that a de novo scope of review
is appropriate for whistleblower cases because section 7623(b) mandates the payment of an
award of at least 15% in certain circumstances. See Edward A. Morse, Whistleblowers and
Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the "Tax Gap," 24 AKRON TAX J. 1, 24
(2009); Levine, Peyser, & Weintraub, 630-4th T.M., Tax Court Litigation, at A-5.
133 See Porter v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. at 120.
134 Id.

135Nick A. Zotos, Service Collection Abuse of Discretion: What is the Appropriate
Standard of Review and Scope of the Record in Collection Due Process Appeals, 62 TAX
LAW. 223, 227 (Fall 2008) (stating that "if the Tax Court is going to apply a true abuse of
discretion standard that is limited to the administrative record, then there must be an
administrative record for the Tax Court to review").
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adequate records to justify the denial of whistleblower awards or the
amount of whistleblower awards paid under the pre-2006 amendments.136 If
the administrative record is inadequate, it is unclear whether the Tax Court
would be permitted to remand the claim to the Service to further develop
the record. 137 Even under an abuse of discretion scope of review, a court
would be permitted to go outside of the record if "there [is a] failure to
explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial review." 138
Any discovery allowed by the whistleblower that would obtain the
taxpayer's returns or return information from the Service presumably would
have to comply with the restrictions on disclosure of taxpayer information
set forth in section 6103.139
The Tax Court recognizes that the scope of review in whistleblower
actions is unclear. The Tax Court in a June 2008 press release containing
proposed amendments to the Court's rules regarding whistleblower actions
said:
The Court's Rules generally contemplate disposition on the
administrative record for disclosure actions and declaratory
judgment actions, pursuant to specific legislative guidance.
Without specific statutory authority or evidence of legislative

136 2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-7 (finding that 32% of claims reviewed
provided insufficient justification of the amounts paid and 76% of claims reviewed provided
insufficient justification for rejecting claims).
137 There is no provision in the IRS Whistleblower Act to permit the Tax Court to
remand claims to the Service. See Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 222 (2005)
(denying the government's motion to remand in a stand-alone innocent spouse case); Parker
v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 327 (2004) (remanding CDP case to provide taxpayer a
hearing at the IRS Appeals Office closest to the taxpayer's residence). But cf I.R.C.
§ 6330(d)(2) (retaining jurisdiction over CDP claims in the IRS Appeals Office).
138 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1973) (per curiam). The whistleblower's
access to the taxpayer's return information should nonetheless be limited. See John A.
Townsend, Section 6103 and the Use of Third Party Tax Return Information in Tax
Litigation, 46 TAX LAW. 923, 934 (1993) (stating that a "court would not permit a taxpayer
to engage in a fishing expedition in third party audit files simply upon the hope of obtaining
relevant and helpful information").
139See infra Part IV for a discussion of section 6103. Section 6103 issues will arise in
Tax Court appeals of whistleblower claims regardless of whether an abuse of discretion or de
novo scope of review applies. The fear is that the Service will not tell the whistleblower or
the Tax Court the basis of the Service's whistleblower award determination by relying on
section 6103 in refusing to disclose the taxpayer's return information in the Tax Court
appeal. See also Townsend, supra note 138, at 935 (discussing a case where the Service
challenged the taxpayers' reliance on their accountants to avoid penalties by relying on
return information of the accountants obtained during a preparer penalty investigation, but
declining to disclose the accountants' tax return information as a violation of section 6103).
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intent establishing whether whistleblower award actions are to be
decided on the administrative record, [the portion of the Tax Court
rules applicable to whistleblower actions] as proposed follows the
general procedures for deficiency and other types of actions before
140
the Court.
In an October 2008 press release adopting the final whistleblower rules, the
Tax Court revised its comments to say that "[w]ithout specific statutory
direction establishing whether whistleblower actions are to be decided on
the administrative record, the Court contemplates that the appropriate scope
14 1
of review will be developed in case law."'
IV. PROTECTION OF TAXPAYER PRIVACY

A. Summary of Section 6103

Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, section 6103 gave the executive
branch broad discretion to disclose tax information by providing that
"[r]etums... shall constitute public records, but.., shall be open to
inspection only upon order of the President and under rules and regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and approved by the
President." 14 2 In practice, the Service treated tax returns and other return
information as a "generalized governmental asset" that was widely
disseminated to federal, state, and local government officials. 14 3 Congress

140

Press

Release,

U.S.

Tax

Court

(June

2,

2008),

available

at

http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/060208.pdf.
141 Press
Release,
U.S.
Tax Court

(Oct.
3, 2008),
available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/1 00308.pdf.
142 I.R.C. § 6103(a); see REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No.
94-266, at 835-853 (2d Sess.1975) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REPORT]
(summarizing the history of the disclosure of federal tax information).
143 PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM'N, FEDERAL TAX RETURN
CONFIDENTIALITY, 13-14
(JUNE 1976) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT]; see also OFFICE OF TAX POLICY
DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS, VOLUME 1: STUDY OF GENERAL PROVISIONS,
21 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 TREASURY REPORT]; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 313, 314-15
(1976), reprintedin 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 1, 335 [hereinafter 1976 BLUEBOOK] (stating that
"the Justice Department and other Federal agencies, as a practical matter, [were] able to
obtain that information for nontax purposes almost at their sole discretion"); 122 CONG. REC.
24,013 (1976) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (characterizing the pre-1976 system as a "lending
library of confidential tax information" where "a myriad of government agencies have
gained access to tax information of the IRS"); ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REPORT, supra

2010]

Whistling Dixie

amended section 6103 in 1976 in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal
after the Nixon White House obtained some of its political opponents' tax
returns from the Service for improper political purposes. 14 4 The 1976
amendments marked a philosophical shift from treating tax information as a
"generalized governmental asset" that the executive branch was able to dole
out at will to a confidential, protected asset that only Congress could
disseminate. 145

The amendments to section 6103 made tax returns and return
information confidential and prohibited the Service from •disclosing
146
taxpayers' tax information absent an explicit legislative exception.
Items
protected from disclosure include tax returns; the taxpayer's identity; the
nature, source, and amount of income, gain, deductions, credits, and other
tax return items; as well as whether the taxpayer "was, is being, or will be
examined or subject to other investigation or processing." 47 Virtually any
information received, prepared, or collected by the Service or furnished 14to8
the Service regarding a person's tax liability is protected from disclosure.
Statutory exceptions permit disclosures for tax administration purposes
to Congress, Department of Justice and Treasury employees, and state tax
officials. 149 However, disclosures are not limited to tax administration.

note 142, at 832-33.
144 In fact, one of the articles of impeachment alleged that President Nixon had
"endeavored to obtain from the Internal Revenue Service, in violation of the constitutional
rights of citizens, confidential information contained in income tax returns for purposes not
authorized by law." IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 3 (1974) (quoted in 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note
143); see also James N. Benedict & Leslie A. Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns-The
Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 940, 941-42
(1978-79); Proposalsfor Administrative Changes in Internal Revenue Service Procedures:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Committee on Ways & Means, 94th

Cong. (1975) (statement of Hon. Jerry Litton).
145PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 28 (concluding that Congress,
rather than the Executive branch, should have the authority to permit the Service to make
disclosures of tax information); see also ADMINSTRATIVE PROCEDURES REPORT, supra note

142, at 1023 (stating that "administrative practice should largely be reversed, and the veil of
confidentiality drawn around returns once again. If it is to be lifted, Congress should do
SO.").

146 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1976).
147 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (defining "return");

I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (defining "return
information").
148See, e.g., Snider v. United States, 468 F.3d 500, 506 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
term "return information" is defined broadly); Payne v. U.S., 289 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir.
2002) (noting the same point).
149 I.R.C. § 6103(d) (state tax officials); I.R.C. § 6103(t) (Congressional committees);

I.R.C. § 6103(h)(1) (Department of Treasury employees); I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2) (Department
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There are exceptions to permit disclosures of tax information in nontax
criminal cases, to assist in the investigation of terrorist activities, and to
federal, state, and local agencies to carry out various government programs0
such as child support enforcement, student loan programs, and Medicare.15
In all, section 6103 includes thirteen exceptions. 15 1 These exceptions
represent Congress's attempt to balance taxpayers' privacy interests against
the government's interest in effectively administering and enforcing the
nation's laws. 152 There is no exception that expressly permits the Service to
disclose a taxpayer's tax information to a whistleblower.
B. Penaltiesfor Violating Section 6103
Certain persons making unauthorized disclosures or inspections of tax
information are subject to penalties under sections 7213, 7213A, and 7431.
Section 7213 imposes a fine not to exceed $5000 and imprisonment of not
more than five years on some individuals-federal employees, persons who
have tax administration contracts pursuant to section 6103(n), and certain
state employees and other persons who willfully disclose returns or return
information as defined in section 6103(b). 153 Section 7213A imposes a fine
not exceeding $1000 and not more than one year imprisonment on certain
individuals, including federal officers or employees and persons with tax
administration contracts, who willfully inspect tax information without
authorization. 154 A federal employee convicted of violating section 7213 or
section 7213A will be discharged from his or her job. 155 Section 7431
permits a taxpayer whose tax information is knowingly or negligently
inspected or disclosed without authorization by a federal officer or
employee in violation of section 6103 to bring a civil suit against the United
States. 156 A taxpayer may also bring a civil suit under section 7431 against
any person who knowingly or negligently inspects or discloses the
taxpayer's tax information in violation of section 6103 even if the person is

of Justice employees).
ISO I.R.C. § 6103(i), (1).

151 I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o).
152 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 327 (stating that "Congress strove to balance the
particular office or agency's need for the information involved with the citizen's right to
privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with
our country's voluntary tax assessment system"); Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the
Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. CoMa. L. Supp. 577, 578 (1998).
153 I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1), (2).
IId. § 7213A.
155

Id. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7213A(b)(2).

156

Id. § 7431(a)(1).
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not an officer or employee of the United States. 157 The amount of damages
that may be recovered under section 7431 includes the greater of actual
damages or $1000 for
disclosure plus costs and attorney
• each unauthorized
158
fees in certain circumstances.
There is no liability under section 7431
with respect to any disclosure or inspection that results from a good faith
but erroneous interpretation of section 6103.159
C. Broken Lines of Communication
Section 6103 hampers communication between the Service and
whistleblowers in at least three ways. First, section 6103 generally prohibits
the Service from providing meaningful updates to whistleblowers regarding
the status of pending whistleblower claims. Second, it is difficult for the
Service to seek the assistance of a whistleblower while building a case
against the taxpayer because section 6103 prohibits the Service from
disclosing the taxpayer's returns or return information to the whistleblower.
Third, section 6103 potentially inhibits communication in claims that are
appealed to the Tax Court. The fear is that the Service will decline to
disclose the basis of its award determination to the extent it must disclose
the taxpayer's return information in the Tax Court proceeding by relying on
section 6103.160

1. Lack of Meaningful Updates and Explanations
Section 6103 generally prohibits the Service from giving meaningful
16 1
updates to whistleblowers regarding the status of their pending claims.
Because the whistleblower cannot be paid until the Service collects from
the taxpayer, the whistleblower's claim may be open for years until the
taxpayer exhausts his or her appeal rights and the taxpayer's case is finally
resolved. 162 TIGTA found it took the Service over 7.5 years from the time163a
claim was filed to pay a whistleblower under the pre-2006 law.
157 Id. § 7431(a)(2).
158 Id. § 743 1(c).
159 Id. § 743 1(b).
160

Townsend, supra note 138, at 935 (discussing a case where the Service relied on

return information of accountants obtained during a preparer penalty investigation to
challenge the taxpayers' reliance on their accountants to avoid penalties, but declined to
disclose the accountants' return information in taxpayers' case due to section 6103).
161 I.R.M. § 25.2.2, exhibit 25.2.2-4 (as in effect as of Feb. 2006).
162 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (stating that awards shall be paid from collected proceeds,
including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts).
163 2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. TIGTA also reported that it took the
Service more than six and a half months to reject a claim. Id.
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Receiving no meaningful status updates during such a long period of time
frustrates
whistleblowers and may dissuade others from blowing the whistle
164
at all.
Even after the Service makes a determination regarding a
whistleblower claim, the whistleblower may never know the specific
reasons behind the Service's determination. For example, section 6103
would prohibit the Service from telling a whistleblower that his or her claim
is rejected for failing to satisfy the section 7623(b) thresholds because the
thresholds (the amount in dispute and an individual taxpayer's gross
income) are return information of the taxpayer. 16 5 Whistleblowers will also
be in the dark if the Service rejects a claim because the taxpayer cannot or
will not pay because payment information is confidential. Even if a claim is
accepted, the Service cannot disclose how it calculated the amount the
taxpayer owes or how much the taxpayer paid because those items are
return information protected from disclosure by section 6103. The
whistleblower will know only the amount of the award. 166 But without
knowing what the Service collected, the whistleblower will not know what
percentage of the collected proceeds was awarded to him or her. 167 For
example, suppose the Service collects $5 million from a delinquent
taxpayer based on information from a whistleblower and pays the
whistleblower a $1 million award, representing 20% of the collected
proceeds. The whistleblower would not know that the award was paid out
of $5 million collected proceeds or that the award represents 20% of the
collected proceeds. As far as the whistleblower knows, the $1 million award
may be 15% of $6.67 million collected or 30% of $3.33 million collected or
something in between. Even more fundamentally, the whistleblower must
rely on a Service determination of whether he or she is entitled to a
determination that is appealable to the Tax Court, because whether or not an
administrative or judicial action resulted from the whistleblower's
164 2006 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
165

I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (describing thresholds); I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (defining return

information to include the amount of income and tax liability); Todd Simmens, Proposed
Whistle-Blower Reforms: Not Ready for Prime Time, 2004 TNT 212-28 (Nov. 2, 2004)
(analyzing changes proposed in 2004 to section 7623). There is no guidance as to when those
amounts will be measured. The lack of guidance can be problematic. For example, the
amount of the potential deficiency measured at the time the Service initiates an audit of a
taxpayer may be different from the amount measured at the time the audit is completed.
Suppose the Service, based on tax information from the whistleblower, initiates an audit of
the taxpayer. By the time the Service completes the audit, the estimated deficiency is less
than $2 million. Does the whistleblower qualify for a whistleblower award under these
circumstances?
166 See Conway v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 572 (2003).
167 See id.
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information is generally based on the taxpayer's return information that is
protected from disclosure.
The Service position is that it is able to tell the whistleblower whether
his or her claim remains open or has been closed without violating section
6103.168 If a claim is closed, the Service has said that it may disclose to the
whistleblower the amount of the award or that a claim is denied. 69 The
letter the Service used to reject claims before the 2006 amendments stated
that "[f]ederal disclosure and privacy laws prohibit us from telling you the
specific reason for rejecting your claim."' 170 The letter listed the following
three most common reasons for rejecting a claim: (1) the whistleblower's
information did not cause an investigation or result in the collection of tax,
penalties, or fines; (2) the Service already had the information that the
whistleblower provided; and (3) the taxes recovered were too small to
warrant an award. 17 1 The letter was utterly meaningless to whistleblowers
because the actual reason for rejecting a particular whistleblower's claim
may have been one or more or none of the listed reasons.172
2.

Limited Collaboration with Whistleblowers

Section 6103 also impedes meaningful communication because the
Service cannot readily collaborate with the whistleblower. The purpose of
the Service whistleblower program is to provide the government with
information it does not have. 173 Consequently, section 7623 and the Service
whistleblower program contemplate a flow of information from a
whistleblower to the Service, a situation that does not implicate section
6103.174 Nonetheless, there inevitably will be situations where it would be
beneficial for the Service to collaborate with the whistleblower. 175 A
168IRS,

Confidentiality and Disclosure for

Whistleblowers,

available at

http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/ 0,,id=1 81291,00.html.
169 Id.

170 Letter 1010 (SC), reprinted in I.R.M. § 25.2.2., Exhibit 25.2.2-7 (as in effect as of
Feb. 2006).
171 Id.
172Krug v. United States, 168 F.3d 1307, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see supra notes 35-41
and accompanying text.
173I.R.C. § 7623(b)(2) (providing for potential awards of 15% to 30% of recovered
amounts but an award of only up to 10% if the information the whistleblower provides has
already been publicly disclosed).
174 Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6103(a) (prohibiting Service employees from disclosing returns
and return information unless a statutory exception applies).
175 Whitlock Interview, supra note 70, at 84 (recognizing that whistleblowers may not
have direct knowledge and that the Service may corroborate the information that a
whistleblower provides).
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whistleblower could help interpret and evaluate documents that the Service
76
obtains pursuant to an administrative summons or otherwise. 1
Alternatively, the Service may want to use the whistleblower to corroborate
the taxpayer's position. The whistleblower would help the Service build a
case against a potentially delinquent taxpayer, particularly where the
delinquency arises from a complex transaction of which the whistleblower
has specific knowledge. The Whistleblower Office acknowledges that
whistleblowers are "uniquely placed" to assist the Service in its
investigations.177 Yet, section 6103 generally prohibits sharing a taxpayer's
returns or return information with the whistleblower.
3.

Potentially Meaningless Tax Court Appeal Right

Whistleblowers who file claims under section 7623(b) have the right to
appeal their award determinations to the Tax Court by filing a petition
within thirty days of the Service's determination 178 An appeal presumably
is available only if the whistleblower's information caused the Service to
initiate an administrative or judicial action against the taxpayer. 179 For the
appeal right to be fair and meaningful, the whistleblower has to understand
the basis of the Service's determination. 18 However, the Service has
invoked section 6103 in the past to avoid disclosing to whistleblowers the
reasons for denying claims or justifying the award amounts paid.
D. Applicability of Existing Section 6103 Exceptions
There are two existing exceptions in section 6103 that potentially
permit the Service to communicate and collaborate with the whistleblower
but neither exception is very satisfying. One potential exception is the
investigative disclosure exception under section 6103(k)(6). The other is the
tax administration contract exception under section 6103(n).

176

See, e.g., Jarvis v. Commissioner, 47 Fed. CI. 698, 705 (2000) (noting that the

whistleblower "work[ed] for the IRS in reviewing and interpreting documents seized" from
the taxpayer).
177 Stephen Whitlock, ABA Administrative Practice Meeting, New Orleans
(CD-ROM,
Jan. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
178 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(4); Dacosta v. United States, 82 Fed. CI. 549,
555 (2008) (stating
that the Tax Court has exclusive jurisdiction over section 7623(b) claims); see supra notes
107-141 and accompanying text (discussing the Tax Court appeal right).
179 See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
180 Whitlock Interview, supra note 70, at 93.
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1. Section 6103(k)(6) Investigative Disclosure Exception
The investigative disclosure exception in section 6103(k)(6) permits
Service employees to disclose return information, but not the tax returns
themselves, to third parties to obtain information that is not otherwise
readily available.' 8 1 This information may include the fact that the taxpayer
is under audit or how the taxpayer treated a transaction on a return. 182 The
legislative history to section 6103(k)(6) contemplates that the investigative
disclosure exception applies only if "no reasonable alternative exists" and
is under
that disclosures of information beyond the fact that the taxpayer
83
extraordinary."
and
"rare
be
would
audit or other investigation
Disclosures made using the investigative disclosure exception are to be
made only as provided by the Treasury Regulations. 184 The regulations
broadly provide that Service employees may disclose return information "to
the extent necessary to obtain information" relating to their official duties or
to accomplish any activity connected with their official duties. 185 One
official duty is "[o]btaining the services of persons having ... knowledge of
particular facts and circumstances relevant" to determining a taxpayer's
correct tax liability. 186 The regulations clarify that the term "necessary"
does not mean "essential or indispensable, but rather appropriate or helpful
in obtaining the information sought."' 187 Thus, disclosure is permissible
under section 6103(k)(6) if the Service employee reasonably believes at the
time of disclosure that the disclosure is appropriate or helpful to obtain
information to perform properly his or her official duties or to accomplish
any activity in connection with his or her official duties. 188 There is no
requirement that the employee seek the information from the taxpayer
first. 189 It is also entirely appropriate for an employee to make disclosures
witnesses to corroborate information provided by the
to third-party
90
taxpayer.'
Section 6103(k)(6) may not be used solely to provide information or as
part of a quid pro quo arrangement; thus, it cannot be relied on merely to
181 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6). 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 350.
182 See id.
183 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 350.

184 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6); see also S. REP. No. 94-938, at 342 (1976), reprintedin 1976-3
C.B. (vol. 3) 380 (1976).
185 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(a)(1) (2006).
186 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(a)(1)(v).
187 Treas. Reg. § 301-6103(k)(6)-1(c)(1).
188 Id.

189 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(c)(3).
190 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(c)(3) ex. 2.
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permit the Service to provide the whistleblower with updates. 19 1 Section
6103(k)(6) could theoretically be used to permit the Service to collaborate
with the whistleblower, but as discussed below, the Service intends that any
collaboration or status updates take place using Section 6103(n).
2.

Section 6103(n) Tax Administration Contract Exception

Section 6103(n) permits the Service, pursuant to regulations, to
disclose returns and return information "to any person ... to the extent
necessary in connection with the processing, storage, transmission, and
reproduction of such returns and return information, the programming,
maintenance, repair, testing, and procurement of equipment,
and the
• •
..
,,192
providing of other services, for purposes of tax administration.
The
implementing Treasury Regulations permit disclosures pursuant to section
6103(n) only pursuant to written contracts or agreements for equipment or
193
services, which are sometimes referred to as tax administration contracts.
Disclosure is permitted "only if the performance of the contract or
agreement cannot otherwise be reasonably, properly, or economically
194
carried out without the disclosure."'
An off-Code provision of the 2006 amendments to section 7623
19 5
permits the Whistleblower Office to ask the whistleblower for assistance.
The Joint Committee on Taxation's technical explanation contemplates that
the assistance of the whistleblower would be an exceptional circumstance
19 6
that would be accomplished only with a tax administration contract.
Consistent with the Joint Committee's statement, temporary Treasury
191Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-1(c)(1) (2006).
192 I.R.C. § 6103(n); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-1(a)(1) (referring to
I.R.C. §
6103(b)(4) to define tax administration).
193 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-l(a)(1) (2007).
194 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-l(b)(1) (2007).
195Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(b)(1)(C), 120
Stat. 2922, 2960 (2006).
196 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF
H.R. 6408, THE "TAX RELIEF AND HEALTH CARE ACT OF 2006," AS INTRODUCED IN THE

HOUSE ON DECEMBER 7, 2006, at 89 (Joint Comm. Print 2006), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prgl21206.pdf. The Joint Committee's technical
explanation said "[u]nder the provision, the Whistleblower Office may seek assistance from
the individual providing information or from his or her legal representative, and may
reimburse the costs incurred by any legal representative out of the amount of the reward. To
the extent the disclosure of returns or return information is required to render such
assistance, the disclosure must be pursuant to an IRS tax administration contract." Id. There
is an off-Code provision permitting the whistleblower to assist the Service. However, neither
the proposed nor enacted form of the legislation contains a provision permitting the
reimbursement of whistleblower lawyers out of the award.

2010]

Whistling Dixie

Regulations require a tax administration contract to be in place before the
Service may collaborate with a whistleblower or provide a whistleblower
with status updates of his or her claim. 197 The temporary regulations permit
the Service to 98disclose return information, but not tax returns, to the
whistleblower. 1

The Whistleblower Office acknowledges that whistleblowers are
"uniquely placed" to assist the Service in its investigations, but expects to
enter into tax administration contracts with whistleblowers "only
infrequently."' 9 9 As of January 2009, the Service has not signed a tax
administration agreement with a whistleblower under the revised
is not providing status
whistleblower law, which means that the Service
20 0
updates to, or collaborating with, whistleblowers.
3.

Why Does the Service View Section 6103(n) as Preferable to Section
6103(k)(6)?

There is a reasonable argument that the investigative disclosure
exception in section 6103(k)(6) permits the Service to collaborate with a
whistleblower to the extent that the Service employee reasonably believes at
the time of disclosure that the disclosure is appropriate or helpful to obtain
information to perform properly his or her official duties or to accomplish
any activity in connection with his or her official duties. 20 1 Nonetheless, the
Service requires that a whistleblower be hired pursuant to a tax
administration contract under section 6103(n) rather than relying on the
investigative disclosure exception in section 6103(k)(6). 2 02 Presumably, the
Service views section 6103(n) as preferable because there are certain
6103(n) that do not apply to disclosures
safeguards mandated by section
20 3
6103(k)(6).
section
made under
Section 6103(a)(3) prohibits persons under a tax administration
contract and certain other specified persons from disclosing tax

197T.D. 9389, 2008-18 I.R.B. 863.

198Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(a)(1) (2008).
199T.D. 9389, 2008-18 I.R.B. 863, 864.
200 Jeremiah Coder, Private Client Suits Might Inform Future Whistleblower Cases,
2009 TNT 6-4 (Jan. 12, 2009); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(b)(3) (2008).
201 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(a)(1)(v); Jones v. United States, 207 F.3d 508,
510 (8th Cir. 2000).

202 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(a)(1) (2008).
203 IRS, DISCLOSURE &-PRIVACY LAW MANUAL 4-16 (stating that an expert should be
retained pursuant to a tax administration contract so that the restrictions and sanctions of
section 6103(n) apply).
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information. 204 The disclosure restrictions imposed by section 6103(a)(3)
do not apply to persons who receive return information under section
6103(k)(6). Persons with tax administration contracts are subject to civil
and criminal penalties under sections 7213 and 7213A for the unauthorized
inspection or disclosure of return information. 205 In contrast, disclosures
20 6
made pursuant to section 6103(k)(6) are not subject to these penalties.
Persons covered by tax administration contracts, but not those covered by
section 6103(k)(6), must submit its facilities to Service inspection to ensure
that tax information is adequately protected from unauthorized
disclosure.

20 7

Not all persons
returns or return information are restricted
•, .who receive
208
from making disclosures.
Nor do the civil and criminal penalties for
unauthorized disclosures apply to all persons who receive disclosures under
section 6103. 209 Also, there is no coherent rationale justifying the inclusion
or exclusion of persons from the disclosure restrictions or the civil or
criminal penalties. 2 1 Consequently, legitimate questions may be raised
about whether disclosures to whistleblowers should be subject to disclosure

204

I.R.C. § 6103(a)(3); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(b)(4) (2008). Other

persons prohibited from disclosing tax information include one-percent shareholders who
receive disclosures of the corporate return, child support enforcement agencies, agencies
seeking to reduce tax overpayments for debts of the taxpayer, and agencies who receive
information in connection with federal benefit programs such as Medicare and federal loan
programs. I.R.C. § 6103(a)(3). The Treasury Regulations prohibit a contractor from
disclosing returns or return information received under section 6103(n) unless the contractor
receives written permission from the Service. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-l(a).
205 I.R.C. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7213A; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(c) (2008).
206 I.R.C. §§ 7213(a)(1), 7213A(a)(1)(B); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-1(c),
(d) (2007);
I.R.M. § 11.3.21.5(1) (Mar. 28 2008); see supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text
(discussing the penalties that apply to unauthorized disclosures of returns and return
information). The notification of possible liability is typically included in the contract for
services. I.R.S. Field Service Adv. Mem. 1995 FSA LEXIS 360, at *5 (Mar. 24, 2005). The
Privacy Act provides for criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures by contractors who
provide an entire system of records, but the Privacy Act provisions may not apply to
disclosures made to whistleblowers under section 6103(k)(6) absent a contract restricting the
whistleblower from disclosing any tax information. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1) (2004); I.R.M. §§
11.3.21.4 (2008), 11.3.21.5 (2008).
207 Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-1(c), (e) (2007); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2T(d)
(2008).
208 See supra note 204.
209 See supra notes 205-206.

210 For example, restrictions on disclosure are limited to federal and state officers and
employees, certain local law enforcement persons, child support agencies, one-percent
shareholders, certain persons who receive tax information for nontax purposes, and
contractors with tax administration contracts. I.R.C. § 6103(a).
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restrictions and civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures. Is
the sharing of tax information as part of the Service whistleblower program
any more intrusive than disclosures made under other section 6103
provisions where recipients are not prohibited from making disclosures and
are not subject to civil or criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures?
For example, is disclosing to a third party that a taxpayer is under audit,
which could be made under section 6103(k)(6), any more intrusive than
disclosing information to a third party who tipped off the Service and thus,
is aware of the taxpayer's potential tax problems?
Assuming whistleblowers should be prohibited from disclosing the
taxpayer's tax information and subject to civil and criminal penalties for
unauthorized disclosure, requiring tax administration contracts is not the
most desirable approach. Requiring tax administration contracts as a
prerequisite to communicate and collaborate with the whistleblower creates
a burden that will extend the processing of whistleblower claims and
potentially may limit the number of whistleblower claims. 2 11 In addition,
the Whistleblower Office's intention to use tax administration contracts
only infrequently surely is detrimental to the effectiveness of the
whistleblower program.
4.

Section 6103(h) Exception for Administrative or Judicial Proceedings

While section 6103 generally prohibits the Service from disclosing
taxpayer information, section 6103(h)(4) permits the disclosure of returns
and return information
certain
. ••
•in •.
212 administrative or judicial proceedings
pertaining to tax administration. The term "tax administration" is broadly
defined to include "the administration, management, conduct, direction, and
supervision of the execution and application of the internal revenue laws"
as well as "litigation ...under such laws." 2 13 There cannot be any serious
dispute that a whistleblower's appeal to the Tax Court pursuant to section
7623(b)(4) is a judicial proceeding pertaining to tax administration within
the meaning of section 6103(h)(4), because it is a proceeding before the
U.S. Tax Court involving litigation under the internal revenue laws. 2 14 The

211 See Paul D. Scott, Beware the Whistleblower: Will the IRS Take a Page out of
DOJ's Playbook, 58 TAx EXECUTIVE 449, Nov. 1, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22912304

(describing limitations of the Special Agreement Program under prior law).
212 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4) (2006).

213 I.R.C. §§ 6103(b)(4)(A)(i), 6103(b)(4)(B); accord First W. Gov't Secs. Inc., v.
United States, 796 F.2d 356, 360 (10th Cir. 1986) (citing Davidson v. Brady, 559 F. Supp.
456, 460-61 (W.D. Mich. 1983)).
214

Conway v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 572, 577 (2003); Confidential Informant v.

United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 556, 559 (2000). The phrase "pertaining to tax administration" is
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exceptions in section 6103(h) are intended to permit disclosures of tax
information of a person whose tax liability gave rise to the litigation but
who is not a party to the proceeding (i.e., the person on whom the whistle is
215
blown).
a. Section 6103(h)(4)(B) Item Test
The item test in section 6103(h)(4)(B) may apply to permit the Service
to disclose a taxpayer's return or return information to a whistleblower in a
whistleblower appeal to the extent that the "treatment of an item reflected
on [the nonparty taxpayer's] return is directly related to the resolution of an
issue in the [whistleblower] proceeding." 2 16 The Court of Federal Claims in
Confidential Informant v. United States applied the item test to permit a
whistleblower under the pre-2006 law to discover tax information of the
person against whom the whistle was blown. 2 17 The whistleblower in
Confidential Informant agreed to provide the Service information about a
third party's violation of the federal tax laws pursuant to an agreement
entered into between the Service and the whistleblower. 2 18 The
whistleblower sued seeking a declaratory judgment, an accounting, and
breach of contract damages after the Service denied the whistleblower's
claim for an award. 2 19 The whistleblower submitted discovery to the
Service, seeking information to support its claim to an award, but the
Service declined to produce the requested information by relying on section
6103. 220 The Court, concluding that the item test applied, compelled22the
1
Service to respond to certain of the whistleblower's discovery requests.

broadly defined. See Hobbs v. United States, 209 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2000). In Hobbs, the
Fifth Circuit found that the Service was permitted to disclose return information pursuant to
section 6103(h)(4)(A) to defend against charges that it improperly discharged one of its
employees. Id.at 411. The discharged employee filed an appeal with the Merit Systems
Protection Board and filed a civil rights suit in federal district court. Id.at 409. To defend
against charges that it improperly discharged the employee, the Service disclosed the former
employee's tax information. Id.at 410. The Fifth Circuit found the disclosures pertained to
tax administration because "[tihe IRS's decision to terminate him for failure accurately to
file his own returns was motivated in large part by the fact that this failure undermined the
IRS's confidence in his ability to perform his essential job functions, which unquestionably
encompassed tax administration." Id. at 411.
215 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 143, at 46.

218

I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B) (2006); accordConfidentialInformant, 45 Fed. Cl. at 556.
ConfidentialInformant, 45 Fed. Cl. at 556.
Id.

219

Id. at 557.

220

Id.
Id. at 559-60.

216
217

221
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Notwithstanding the decision in Confidential Informant, there are
questions regarding the applicability of section 6103(h)(4)(B) to
whistleblower appeals. First, the item test requires a direct relationship
between an issue in the proceeding and the treatment of an item on the
taxpayer's return. 222 Some courts, however, have applied the item test by
finding a direct relationship between an issue in the proceeding and the
information sought, even if not an item on the taxpayer's return. 22 3 Second,
the whistleblower has to show that an item from the taxpayer's return or
other requested
information would resolve an issue in the whistleblower
224
proceeding.
The third question is whether the taxpayer's tax information is "directly
related" to the resolution of an issue in the whistleblower proceeding. The
Court of Federal Claims in Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States analyzed
the meaning of the phrase "directly related" in the item test, which
Congress left undefined in the statute. 225 Shell sought return information of
its competitors in its refund suit to prove that it was entitled to a tax credit
under section 29 for the production of oil from tar sands. 22 6 Tar sands are
"[t]he several rock types that contain an extremely viscous hydrocarbon
which is not recoverable in its natural state by conventional oil well
production methods including currently used enhanced recovery
techniques." 2 27 The government's position was that Shell was entitled to a
section 29 credit only by showing that it used an unconventional method to
recover oil from tar sands. 228 Shell filed a motion to compel the Service to
turn over tax information attached to the tax returns of Shell's competitors
who sought a tax credit under section 43, which gives a credit to taxpayers
who recover crude oil using certain recovery methods. 229 Shell sought this
information to inferentially support its claim that the production method it
used to recover oil from tar sands was not used by anyone else in the
industry and thus was unconventional. 23 The Court of Federal Claims,
relying on the item test, ordered the Service to produce the information that
Shell sought in unredacted form for in camera inspection, and presumably
ordered the government to produce redacted information to Shell. 2 31 The
I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).
See, e.g., Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 812, 816-19 (2000).
224 ConfidentialInformant, 45 Fed. Cl. at 559.
225 Shell Petroleum,Inc., 47 Fed.Cl. at 816-820.
226 Id. at 814-15. Congress redesignated section 29 as section 45K in 2005.
227 Id. at 815.
222
223

228

Id.

229 Id.
230 Id.

231 Id.at 820; Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1, 19 (2001) (stating
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court held that the definition of "relevant evidence" in rules 401 and 404 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence "serves as a helpful guide" to determine the
232
meaning of "directly related" in section 6103(h)(4)(B).
A district court in Beresford v. United States used the item test to
require the Service to disclose to a decedent's estate third-party tax
information that the Service had used to value shares of stock held by the
decedent at her death. 233 The decedent's estate in Beresford paid tax based
on the Service's higher valuation• of the
stock and sought a refund, alleging
..234
that the stock was valued incorrectly.
The district court granted the
estate's motion to compel, reasoning that disclosure of third-party
information to the estate was permitted under the item test set forth in
section 6103(h)(4)(B). 235 The Service had relied on third-party information
to value decedent's stock and thus, the third-party information was directly
related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding. 2 36 The court ordered
the Service to turn over the requested information after redacting the third
parties' identifying information. The court restricted the parties' use of the
information only to the present proceeding and ordered the parties to
2 37
destroy the information after the judgment became final.
A fourth question in applying section 6103(h)(4)(B) to whistleblower
appeals is whether the item test applies only if the issue to be resolved in
the whistleblower proceeding is the whistleblower's tax liability. 23 8 The
government in Tavery v. United States made such an argument relying on
the legislative history, which provides:
The disclosure of a third party return in a tax proceeding
(including the United States Tax Court) will be subject to the same
item and transaction tests described [in section 6103(h)(2)], except

that following the in camera review, the court in Shell Petroleum "apparently released
heavily redacted versions of the certificates to the plaintiff'). Although the court in Shell
Petroleum presumably required that the nonparty's tax information be redacted, the language
of section 6103(h)(4) does not require the redaction of information. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4); see
Lebaron v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
232 Shell Petroleum, Inc., 47 Fed. Cl. at 819; cf Vons Companies, Inc., 51 Fed. Cl. at 19
(holding that the taxpayer could not obtain third-party tax information in refund suit because
information sought was not "directly related" to the resolution of an issue within the
meaning of section 6103(h)(4)(B) in the taxpayer's refund suit).
233 Beresford v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 232, 235 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
234 Id. at 232.
235 Id. at 235.
236

Id.; see generally Lebaron v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947 (C.D. Cal. 1992)

(discussing meaning of "directly related").
237 Beresford, 123 F.R.D. at 235.
238 Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1429 (10th Cir. 1994).
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that such items and transactions must have a direct2 39
relationship to
liability.
taxpayer's
the
of
issue
an
the resolution of
The item test applies if the treatment of the information sought is directly
related to the resolution of an issue in an administrative or judicial
proceeding pertaining to tax administration. 24 Because the statute itself
does not limit disclosure only to proceedings where tax liability is at issue,
the Tenth Circuit rejected the government's interpretation. 24 1 The Tenth
Circuit in Tavery v. United States held that
the item test applies even if the
242
issue in the proceeding is not tax liability.
Reading these authorities together seems to mean that disclosure of the
taxpayer's tax information in a whistleblower appeal to the Tax Court
would be permissible under the item test to the extent that an item on the
taxpayer's return or other information sought is relevant to the resolution of
an issue in the whistleblower's Tax Court proceeding, namely whether the
Service's award determination is appropriate. Thus, the item test set forth in
section 6103(h)(4)(B) may apply under the right circumstances to permit
the disclosure of the taxpayer's tax information to the whistleblower.
b. Section 6103(h)(4)(C) Transaction Test
A harder case to make is that section 6103(h)(4)(C), the transaction
test, should apply in whistleblower actions if there is no transactional
relationship between the taxpayer and the whistleblower. 243 Section
6103(h)(4)(C) applies if the "return or return information directly relates to
a transactional relationship between a person who is a party to the
proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue
in the proceeding." ' 244 Examples of transactional relationships that have
qualified under section 6103(h)(4)(C) include investors and promoters in a
tax shelter, participants in joint ventures
or other business deals, and
245
participants in fraudulent conveyances.
239

Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 326 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3439, 3755).
240 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(B).
241

Tavery, 32 F.3d at 1430 (stating that "[t]o the extent tension may exist between the

broad but plain language of the statute and its legislative history, we follow Judge Friendly's
application of 'the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is
doubtful, go to the statute').
242

Id. at 1429-30.

I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).
244 Id.
245 See Galotto, La Puma & Pai, 625 T.M., Obtaining Information from the
243

Government-DisclosureStatutes, notes 970-77 and accompanying text.
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c. Section 6103(h)(4)(A) Test
When the Tax Reform Act was enacted in 1976, section 6103(h)(4)(A)
permitted the disclosure of returns or return information . .in2 4 6a judicial
proceeding only if the taxpayer was a party to the proceeding.
In 1978,
section 6103(h)(4)(A) was expanded to permit disclosures even if the
taxpayer was not a party to the proceeding if "the proceeding arose out of,
or in connection with, determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal
liability.., in respect of any tax imposed under this title."' 24 7 The 1978
revisions were made to cover summons enforcement proceedings where the
taxpayer did not or was unable to intervene and in transferee liability
cases. 248
The Service discloses taxpayer information in transferee liability cases
to attempt to hold the transferee liable for the transferor-taxpayer's tax
liability. In summons enforcement proceedings, the Service discloses
2 49
taxpayer information to determine the taxpayer's own tax liability.
Whistleblower proceedings are different from summons enforcement
proceedings and transferee liability cases because a whistleblower seeks the
disclosure of a taxpayer's tax information in a whistleblower proceeding to
determine the proper amount of his or her whistleblower award.
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable argument that section 6103(h)(4)(A)
should permit the Service to disclose the taxpayer's tax information in a
Tax Court appeal. 25 The whistleblower proceeding literally arises out of
determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal liability as required by section
6103(h)(4)(A). A whistleblower appeal to the Tax Court arises only after
the whistleblower provides information to the Service that caused an
administrative or judicial proceeding against a taxpayer who violated the
25 1
tax laws.
246 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 1201, § 6103(h)(4)(A),
90 Stat.

1550, 1667, 1674 (1976) (current version at I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A)).
247 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 503(b)(2), 92 Stat. 2763, 2880 (1978)
(current version

at I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A)). Identical language is used in I.R.C.
§ 6103(h)(2)(A), which permits disclosures of tax information to the Department of Justice.
248 H.R. REP. No. 95-1800, vol. 1, at 627 (1978) (Conf. Rep.). See generally
I.R.C. §
6901 (discussing transferee liability procedures);

I.R.C. § 7604 (discussing summons
enforcement procedures).
249 See I.R.C. § 6901 (transferee liability procedures); I.R.C. § 7604
(summons
enforcement procedures).
250 There are few cases interpreting section 6103(h)(4)(A)
and in many of those cases,
the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding. See, e.g., Abelein v. United States, 323 F.3d 1210,
1216 (9th Cir. 2003); Rice v. United States, 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Hartman
v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. M. (CCH) 1649 (2009).
251 See 2000 TREASuRY REPORT, supra note 143, at 43 (stating that "Congress...
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Section 6103(h)(4)(A) should permit the Service to disclose a
taxpayer's tax information during status updates and collaborations with the
whistleblower if there is an administrative proceeding pertaining to tax
administration. 252 The Service considers an audit to be an administrative
proceeding within the meaning of section 6103(h)(4), but there is a conflict
in the courts as to whether an253audit is an administrative proceeding for
purposes of section 6103(h)(4).
Another uncertainty is whether the section 6103(h)(4) exceptions
permit disclosure to third parties in administrative or judicial proceedings
or
• 254
only apply to disclosures made to federal officers and employees.
The
better argument is that section 6103(h) is not limited to disclosures only to
government officers and employees. Otherwise, the Service and the
Department of Justice would be prohibited from disclosing tax information
in judicial proceedings where the taxpayer is a party. 255 Moreover, section
6103(h) is entitled "Disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for
purposes of tax administration, etc." The term "etc." does not modify the
phrase "for purposes of tax administration"
because all of the subsections of
....
256
section 6103(h) involve tax administration.
Rather, the term "etc." in the
title implies that disclosures other than to federal officers and employees are
permitted. 2 57 Finally, section 6103(h)(4)(D) permits the disclosure of return

permitted the disclosure of tax information of the taxpayer... whose liability gave rise to
the case.").
252 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
253

Compare Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1122 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that

an audit is not an administrative proceeding for purposes of section 6103(h)(4)(C)), with
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Notice 2006-006 (Nov. 22, 2005) (discussing three cases concluding
that audits are administrative proceedings for purposes of section 6103(h)(4)).
254 Compare Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that
section 6103(h)(4) applies only to disclosures to federal officers and employees), and Aloe
Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-2788, 2002-2790 (D. Ariz. 2002)
(same), with First W. Gov't Secs. Inc. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356, 360 (10th Cir. 1986)
(disclosure of taxpayer's return information to third parties permitted under section
6103(h)(4)(C)).
255 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(A).
256 See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(1) (permitting disclosure to Treasury Department officers and
employees for tax administration purposes); I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2)-(3) (permitting disclosure
to Justice Department officers and employees for tax administration matters); I.R.C.
§ 6103(h)(4) (permitting disclosure in judicial or administrative proceedings pertaining to
tax administration); I.R.C. § 6103(h)(5) (permitting disclosure to the Social Security
Administration or Railroad Retirement Board for "purposes of carrying out its
responsibilities for withholding tax under section 1441"); I.R.C. § 6103(h)(6) (prohibiting
disclosure to employees, detailees, and certain members of the IRS Oversight Board).
257 Galotto, La Puma & Pai, supra note 245, at notes 931-41 and accompanying text.
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information to a criminal defendant-who is not a federal officer or
employee.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

A. A Legislative Fix is Required
Section 7623(b) is intended to incentivize insiders who have
substantive information to blow the whistle on persons who do not pay their
taxes. 258 However, as currently conceived, the Service whistleblower
program in section 7623(b) is an "empty promise" because it is at crosspurposes with the confidentiality restrictions imposed by section 6103.259
Congress enacted the enhancements to section 7623 in 2006 without
loosening any of the section 6103 restrictions, leaving the Service to hobble
along in its tax administration duties.
To shore up the Service whistleblower program, Congress should make
the process more participatory. The devil, of course, is in the details. One
obvious solution is to amend section 6103 to specifically permit the Service
to communicate and collaborate with whistleblowers without requiring tax
administration contracts and to make disclosures in Tax Court appeals.
Another potential solution is to clarify that existing exceptions to
section 6103 permit disclosures of taxpayers' return information to
whistleblowers during the pendency of a whistleblower claim, including
any appeal of an award determination to the Tax Court. At a minimum, the
whistleblower, during an appeal to the Tax Court, should have access to the
information the Whistleblower Office considered to make its award
determination.
Congress should amend section 6103(a)(3) to prohibit whistleblowers
from disclosing returns or return information received absent statutory
authority or permission from the Service. Congress should also amend
section 7213 and section 7213A to subject whistleblowers to civil and
criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosures. In the alternative, Congress
should amend section 7623 to disqualify a whistleblower who makes
unauthorized disclosures from receiving an award, or require the
whistleblower to repay an award if found making unauthorized disclosures.
Whistleblowers could be notified of the disclosure restrictions and their
potential liability for civil and criminal penalties by including such
statements in IRS Form 211, the form that whistleblowers must file when
applying for an award.
258 2008 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 51, at Executive Summary.

Camp, supra note 124, at 89 (referring to the right of taxpayers to appeal
collection
due process determinations made by the Service as an "empty promise").
259
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Congress could use section 6103(k)(10), one of the most recent
amendments to section 6103, as a template for making appropriate
legislative changes to protect the taxpayer's information. Congress enacted
section 6103(k)(10) in 2008 to permit the Service to disclose to the head of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons return information of prisoners who may
have filed fraudulent tax returns. 26 Lifting the section 6103 restrictions
permits the Service to share information with prison officials, which would
allow the officials to stop inmates from conspiring with other inmates and
non-inmates to submit fraudulent returns in order to receive refunds they
are not entitled to. 26 1 The 2008 legislation subjects disclosures made under
section 6103(k)(10) to the safeguards set forth in section 6103(p)(4), which
requires certain federal agencies and other recipients, as a condition to
receiving disclosures from the Service, to agree to keep the tax information
received secure and restrict access to persons whose duties require access.
Congress ordered TIGTA to report to Congress not later than December 31,
2010 on the implementation of section 6103(k)(10), 262 which expires at the
end of 2011. 263 It seems worth the effort to implement improvements and
associated safeguards to the whistleblower program. Any trepidation can be
mitigated by making the changes expire, thus requiring Congress to study
the effectiveness and consequences of the provisions and affirmatively act
to continue them.
There is good evidence that suggests that Congress and the Obama
administration may be supportive of amendments to section 6103 to
strengthen the IRS Whistleblower Act. While President Obama was in the
Senate he co-sponsored the Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of
2005, which included amendments to section 7623 similar to the reforms
eventually enacted in 2006. 264 Then-senator Obama along with 78 of the
other 100 senators and almost 85% of the House of Representatives voted
260

Inmate Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-428, § 2(a), 122 Stat.

4839 (2008).
261 To Examine Tax Fraud Committed By Prison Inmates: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement
of Rep. Jim Ramstad, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode-view
&id=4523. A study conducted by the IRS Criminal Investigation Division found that
prisoner returns accounted for 15% of all fraudulently filed returns even though prisoner
returns account for only .43% of all refund returns filed. Id (prepared statement of J. Russell
George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, U.S Department of the
Treasury).
262 I.R.C. § 7803(d)(3)(C).
263 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(10)(D).
264 Tax Shelter and Tax Haven Reform Act of 2005, S. 1565, 109thCong., § 206 (as
introduced July 29, 2005).
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for the 2006 reforms to section 7623. 265 Even Senator Reid, the current
Senate Majority Leader who in 1998 referred to the Service whistleblower
program .as.266 the "Rewards for Rats Program," voted for the 2006
It seems sensible that a Congress who supported the
amendments.
Service's whistleblower program with such strong bipartisan support would
back amendments to section 6103 to make the program better. It is difficult
to vote against a program that helps reduce the tax gap by collecting taxes
more effectively and less expensively than the Service's primary method of
selecting tax returns for audit.
Public attitudes may support amendments to section 6103 to improve
the effectiveness of the Service whistleblower program. 2 67 The IRS
Oversight Board in its 2008 Taxpayer Attitude Survey reported that 94% of
respondents believe it is their civic duty to pay taxes, 89% believe it is
never acceptable to cheat on their taxes, and 60% agree that everyone has a
personal responsibility to report anyone who cheats on their taxes. 268 These
survey results suggest that the public is becoming increasingly intolerant of
269
tax cheats.
B. Tools Available to the Tax Court
To protect the taxpayer's tax information during the appeal of a
whistleblower award, the Tax Court could issue a protective order to
prohibit the whistleblower from disclosing taxpayer return information
received during the appeal and could order appropriate redactions to the
record.27 Tax Court Rule 103 gives the Court broad power to "make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or other person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,"
including "[t]hat a trade secret or other information not be disclosed or be
'27 1
disclosed only in a designated way."
A party or nonparty must make a
motion for a protective order and must show good cause.272
265 152 CONG. REc. S11674 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (Roll Call Vote No. 279). One

Democrat and eight Republicans voted no, and four Democrats, seven Republicans, and one
Independent did not vote. Id.152 CONG. REc. H9024-79 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (Roll Call
Vote 533).
266 Id.; see also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.

267 Ventry, supra note 14, at 373 (stating that "there is reason to believe that efforts to
relax [section 6103] for purposes of further enhancing the tax whistleblower statute might
have some traction among current tax officials and legislators seeking increased
transparency").
268 I.R.S. OVERSIGHT BD., 2008 TAXPAYER ATrITUDE SURVEY, at 2-3 (Feb. 2009).
269 Martin Vaughan, No Pityfor Rich Tax Cheats, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 11, 2009, at D3.

270 See Shell Petroleum Inc. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 719 (2000).
271 TAX CT. R. 103(a)(7). The Tax Court in Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner held that
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The Tax Court could nonetheless exercise its discretion to issue a
protective order even if section 6103(h)(4) permits disclosures to
whistleblowers. The Tax Court in Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner
discussed the intersection of the confidentiality rules in section 6103 and
the court's power under Tax Court Rule 103 to issue protective orders. 2 73 In
Yaeger, a case involving a challenge to the amount of estate tax owed, the
Service sought discovery pertaining to certain financial information to
determine the value of stock at the time of decedent's death. 274 The estate
asked the court for a protective order to prevent the Service from giving the
requested information to the decedent's wife, who had brought several
actions to challenge the decedent's will. 275 The Service argued that section
6103(e) permitted it to give the information to the decedent's wife and that
the court did not have the authority to override Service statutory
authority. 276 While the court acknowledged that section 6103(e) gave the
Service authority to give the documents to be produced to the decedent's
wife, the court held that it has the authority to "condition and restrict the use
of [its] own discovery procedures with respect to information jointly
covered by section 6103 and Rule 103." 277 Thus, even if section 6103(h)(4),
or another section 6103 exception, permits the Service to disclose the
taxpayer's information in the whistleblower proceeding, the Tax Court may
nonetheless issue a protective order with respect to the information
disclosed.
Tax Court Rule 27(d) authorizes the Court to order the redaction of
information in papers filed with the Court and to issue protective orders
under Tax Court Rule 103 relating to filings. 278 The Tax Court could also

a protective order may cover information of any kind and is not limited to trade secrets or
other kinds of business-related information. Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 180,
190 (1989); see also Grandbouche v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 604, 614 (1992) (granting
petitioner's motion for protective order to limit information to be produced in response to the
Service's discovery request).
272 TAx CT. R. 103(a). Good cause may exist where confidential information
is
involved. Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 914, 921 (1985).
273 Yaeger, 92 T.C. 180.
275

Id. at 182.
Id. at 181-82.

276

Id. at 184. Section 6103(e) permits the Service to disclose return information to a

274

beneficiary under a will if she has a material interest that will be affected by the information.
I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(E)(ii). The documents to be produced are return information because it is
information collected by the Service with respect to the estate's tax liability. Yaeger, 92 T.C.
at 186.
277 Yaeger, 92 T.C. at 189.
278 TAx CT. R. 27(d), 103(a).

492
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issue a protective order to seal all or part of the record. 279 The party seeking
to seal all or part of the record must show good cause by explaining the
harm to be suffered if a motion to seal the record is denied. 28 The Court of
Federal Claims, under what is now section 7623(a), initially filed at least
two decisions under seal and then subsequently made the decisions public
after making redactions proposed by the whistleblower and the
government. 281 Sealing of the record is appropriate only if the interest
advanced ,by
. 2the
82 parties outweighs the interest of the public to open judicial
proceedings.
The public's interest in open judicial proceedings is
presumed to override the litigants' interests. 283 The Tax Court, in a press
release accompanying the adoption of Tax Court rules relating to
whistleblower actions, recognized that it is permitted to seal the record
when appropriate, but that it is not required to seal the record in all
2 84
whistleblower actions.
The person with the strongest potential of making a good cause
showing is the taxpayer whose tax information would be disclosed, but who
is not a party in the Tax Court proceeding. While nonparties may move for
a protective order, the taxpayer upon whom the whistle was blown will not
necessarily be aware of the proceeding. If the whistleblower's identity is to
be protected, the Service Chief Counsel cannot notify the taxpayer of the
28 5
proceeding and the Tax Court cannot permit the taxpayer to intervene.

279 I.R.C. § 7461(b)(1); TAx CT. R. 27(c) (sealing filings); TAX CT. R. 103(a)(4)
(restricting matters that may be inquired into): TAx CT. R. 103(a)(7) (protecting "a trade
secret or other information" from disclosure). The general rule is that all reports of the Tax
Court and all evidence that the court receives, including transcripts of proceedings in the
court, are public records that are open to inspection by the public. I.R.C. §§ 7461(a), 7458.
The public has an interest in "free access" to judicial proceedings and an interest in "assuring
that courts are fairly run and judges are honest." Willie Nelson Music Co. v. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 914, 919 (1985).
280 Willie Nelson Music Co., 85 T.C. at 920.
281 See Confidential Informant v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 556 (2000); Jarvis v. United
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 529 (1999).
282 Anonymous v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 89, 91 (2006); Yaeger, 92 T.C. at 189. In
Anonymous v. Commissioner, Judge Kroupa granted petitioner's order to seal the record,
concluding that the risk of physical harm to petitioner outweighed the public interest
favoring access to court records. 127 T.C. at 94.
283 Willie Nelson Music Co., 85 T.C. at 919.
284 Press
Release,
U.S.
Tax
Court
(Oct.
3, 2008), available at
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/l 00308.pdf.
285 I.R.M. § 35.4.6.5(2) (Aug. 11, 2004) (stating that in cases where a petitioner seeks
nonparty tax information, the nonparty should be notified); see Jarvis, 43 Fed. CI. at 531
(issuing a protective order prohibiting parties from disclosing taxpayer's tax information
after getting taxpayer's consent in whistleblower action under what is now section 7623(a)).

2010]

Whistling Dixie

The Service will not seek to seal the record to avoid compromising an
ongoing investigation or audit if at the time of the whistleblower's appeal to
the Tax Court, a final determination has been made in the taxpayer's
286
underlying action and any pending criminal actions are completed.
Nonetheless, the Service may seek an order to protect the absent taxpayer's
interests. However, that approach would be contrary to the current policy of
the Service's Chief Counsel who, in considering itself as representing the
public interest, believes it important to encourage transparency in Tax Court
litigation. 287 Its policy is to resist motions for protective orders that limit
public access
and to urge the court to narrowly construe motions to seal
28 8
records.
Sealing the record protects disclosures from being made to the public,
but does not inhibit the judicial proceedings because the parties in the
action will have access to information to adequately litigate their cases.
However, whatever value exists to future whistleblowers in open judicial
the Tax Court deemphasizes or
proceedings is reduced to the extent 2that
89
opinion.
the
in
findings
edits its factual
VI. JUSTIFYING DISCLOSURES TO WHISTLEBLOWERS

Loosening the section 6103 confidentiality restrictions to permit the
Service to share taxpayer information with whistleblowers should be
unobjectionable because sharing tax information with whistleblowers
assists the Service in performing its tax administration duties. Taxpayers
can hardly complain that the Service collects information from and about
the taxpayer and uses that information to determine the taxpayer's taxes.
Nonetheless, critics may balk at sharing taxpayer information with
whistleblowers, particularly because taxpayers typically will not be notified
or permitted to intervene in whistleblower claims. But disclosures to
whistleblowers are justified even if those disclosures are viewed as being
made for purposes unrelated to tax administration.

286 See I.R.C. § 7623(b) (stating that an award is payable from the collected proceeds).
287

I.R.M. § 35.4.6.5(7) (Aug. 11, 2004).

288

Id.

289 See GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX

7.07 n.56 (2009) ("[T]he court may sometimes minimize the factual
findings in its opinion.").
CONTROVERSIES
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A. Taxpayer Information Will Be Used For Tax Purposes
Congress created the Privacy Protection Study Commission in the
Privacy Act of 1974. 290 One of the Commission's charges was to study
whether the "Internal Revenue Service should be prohibited from
transferring individually identifiable data to other agencies and to agencies
of state government." 29 1 The Commission identified two criteria to be used
to determine
whether it is acceptable for the Service to disclose taxpayer
• ,. .. 292
information.
First, disclosure should be permitted if "the purpose for
which disclosure is made is clearly compatible with the purpose for which
the record originally was created."' 293 Second, disclosures for nontax
purposes should be permitted only if the benefit to the public outweighs the
taxpayer's privacy interests. 294 These criteria are reflected in section 6103,
which permits broader disclosures when a taxpayer's tax information is
used to administer the federal tax laws. 295 Conversely, narrower disclosures
are required when a taxpayer's tax information is used for purposes other
than tax administration because the tax information is being used for a
purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which the information was
collected. The legislative history accompanying the enactment of section
6103 and the scope of the exceptions in section 6103 make clear that
Congress was concerned with the potential consequences of disclosing tax

information to government agencies to be used for nontax purposes.296
290 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(a), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).
291

Id. at § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii).

292 PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 30 (citing the Privacy Act of

1974, § 3(b)).
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Compare I.R.C. § 6103(h) (disclosures for purposes of tax administration), with
I.R.C. § 6103(i) (disclosures for nontax purposes). See also 2000 TREASURY
note 143, at 42.

REPORT,

supra

296 PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 27-28; 2000 TREASURY REPORT,

supra note 143, at 33 (stating that "section 6103 grew out of a desire to protect return
information from unfettered use by the President and various Federal agencies"); Darby,
supra note 152, at 579 (stating that accepted use of tax information is for "collection, audit,
and investigative processes of the Service, as well as in any civil or criminal proceedings
flowing from these tax administrative measures"); S.REP. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 317 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438, 3747 (stating that "[q]uestions have been raised and
substantial controversy created as to whether the present extent of actual and potential
disclosure of return and return information to other Federal and State agencies for nontax
purposes breaches a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the American citizen
with respect to such information"); see also Beresford v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 232, 233
(E.D. Mich. 1988) (stating that it is "apparent that Congress enacted the statute as a shield to
protect taxpayers from improper disclosure by the government of the information they were
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However, disclosures made to a whistleblower will be used for tax
purposes-to determine whether the whistleblower is entitled to an award
that is provided for in the Code for assisting the Service in its tax
administration duties. Thus, a reasonable argument can be made that
disclosing a taxpayer's tax information to a whistleblower is "clearly
compatible with the purpose for which the record originally was created,"
and thus no balancing of interests is required. The fact that the taxpayer's
tax information will be used by the whistleblower, in addition to the
Service, is the price to be paid for an effective whistleblower program.
Arguably, taxpayers opposed to disclosures on personal privacy grounds
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in return information furnished to
or collected by the Service for purposes of determining their own tax
liability.
B. Disclosures to Whistleblowers Are Justified Even If Considered
Nontax Use
For the sake of argument, assume that taxpayers would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information reported to or collected
by the Service if the Service were to share that information with a
whistleblower, even though the information would be used for tax purposes
as part of the Service whistleblower program. One reasonable way to
analyze whether a taxpayer's tax information should be disclosed to a
whistleblower is to apply the specific criteria developed by the Service and
Treasury to
297evaluate proposals from agencies seeking disclosures for nontax
Seven of the nine criteria that the Service and Treasury
purposes.
identified include the following:
1. Is the requested information highly relevant to the program for
which it is to be disclosed?
2. Are there substantial program benefits to be derived from the
requested information?
3. Is the request narrowly tailored to the information actually
necessary for the program?
4. Is the same information reasonably available from another
source?

required to provide to it by law").
297 2000 TREASuRY REPORT, supra note 142, at 68-69.
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5. Will the disclosure involve significant resource demands on the
IRS?
6. Will the information continue to be treated confidentially within
the agency to which it is disclosed, pursuant to standards
prescribed by the IRS?...
8. Will the disclosure
have an adverse impact on tax compliance or
298
tax administration?
Examining these criteria supports the conclusion that disclosures should be
made to whistleblowers as part of the Service whistleblower program.
1. Permitting Disclosures Is Relevant and Beneficial to the Whistleblower
Program
Giving the whistleblower access to a taxpayer's tax information is
highly relevant to the whistleblower program and substantial benefits may
be derived from such disclosures. As discussed elsewhere in this article, the
whistleblower program currently is less effective because the Service
cannot communicate and collaborate with the whistleblower. 299 Moreover,
the whistleblower's Tax Court appeal right is virtually meaningless unless
the whistleblower at least has access to the taxpayer's tax information that
3
the Whistleblower Office considered in making its determination. 00
Permitting disclosures to whistleblowers will make the Service
whistleblower program more meaningful and effective.
Whistleblowers can significantly contribute to Service efforts to
enforce the tax laws, particularly when the whistleblower is an insider who
has access to information that the Service is not aware of.30 1 Without this
insider information, detecting some types of tax violations may be difficult,
if not impossible. 302 Also, whistleblowers can supplement the Service's
understaffed and underfunded resources. 303 Relaxing disclosure restrictions
298

Id. Two additional considerations include, "(7) Other than section 6103, are there

any statutory impediments to implementation of the proposal? . . . (9) Will the disclosure
implicate other sensitive privacy concerns?" Id.
299 See supra notes 161-177 and accompanying text.
300 See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
301 William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting,29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1799, 1822 (1996) (describing the fact that
government has asymmetric information).
302

See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement,

2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 190-91 (2000).
303 Kovacic, supra note 303, at 1824-25.
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will permit the Service to update whistleblowers regarding the status of
their claims and to effectively use whistleblowers' inside expertise. These
benefits in turn make the program more effective to the extent that more
whistleblowers will provide better information to the Service.
2.

Disclosures of Taxpayer Information Can Be Narrowly Tailored and
Appropriate Restrictions Can Be Imposed on Whistleblowers to Protect
Taxpayer Information

Disclosures can be narrowly tailored to the information actually
necessary by giving the Service discretion to determine the frequency and
specificity of status updates; although, certainly an update should be more
specific than "your case is still open." 30 4 Moreover, the Service has
discretion to decide whether to obtain the assistance of a whistleblower and
the scope of disclosure in those situations will be decided on a case-by-case
basis. In a Tax Court appeal, the Service, at a minimum, should provide the
whistleblower a copy of the information used to make the award
determination. Absent facts of a particular case, it is difficult to identify
with any specificity the disclosures that should be made. Nevertheless,
loosening the confidentiality restrictions of section 6103 will go a long way
toward improving the Service whistleblower program by giving the Service
the authority to make relevant and necessary disclosures.
Potential harm to the taxpayer from disclosing his or her tax
information to a whistleblower is mitigated by the fact that whistleblowers
are required to file their claims under penalties of perjury. Moreover,
frivolous or meritless claims and claims that do not meet the dollar
thresholds in section 7623 are ferreted out during the Whistleblower Office
initial screening process, before referring the claims to the Service
operating divisions for further review. To qualify for an award under
section 7623, the information from the whistleblower must cause the
Service to proceed with an administrative or judicial action. 30 5 Presumably,
the Service will not proceed with an administrative or judicial action unless
there is a good faith claim and the information is a sufficiently reliable and
productive lead, rather than mere conjecture. Thus, charges that
whistleblowers are just being vindictive and do not have legitimate claims
can be countered. In addition, compromises of taxpayer privacy would be

304 See supra note 164 and accompanying text; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)2T(b)(3) (2008) (stating that the Service may disclose to a whistleblower with a tax
administration contract whether the claim is being evaluated for potential investigative
action, or is pending due to an ongoing examination, appeal, collection action, or litigation).
305 I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006).
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very limited because whistleblower claims 30constitute
only a small
6
percentage of Service tax administration efforts.
Formal safeguards to protect taxpayer information in the hands of
whistleblowers should be adopted. Such safeguards include prohibiting
whistleblowers from disclosing taxpayer information received and imposing
civil and criminal penalties on whistleblowers who make unauthorized
30 7
disclosures.
3.

Information Is Not Reasonably Available from Other Sources

A taxpayer may be required to produce his or her tax returns or return
information in private litigation unless some privilege applies. 30 8 In
addition, much of the information that section 6103 prohibits the Service
from disclosing is disclosed voluntarily by taxpayers for all sorts of nontax
purposes, such as car loans, educational loans, and home mortgages. 309 In
today's digital world, computer users disclose all sorts of identifying
310
information over the internet and information is much easier to obtain.
Also, information included in tax returns is often available from other
sources. 311
Although information reported to or gathered by the Service generally
may be obtained from other sources, whistleblowers are not permitted to
initiate private litigation against taxpayers to enforce the nation's tax laws.
In addition, a whistleblower cannot acquire information from the taxpayer
or obtain the taxpayer's consent to permit the Service to make disclosures
of the taxpayer's information because the Service protects the
whistleblower's identity "to the fullest extent permitted by law" using its

306

See David E. Joyce, Raiding the Confessional-The Use of Income Tax Returns in

Nontax Criminal Investigations, 48

FORDHAM

L. REv. 1251, 1268 (1980) (noting that

permitting the use of state income tax returns in nontax criminal investigations implicates the
privacy of "only a few taxpayers").
307 See supra Part V.A.
308 St. Regis Paper Co.

v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1961); see Nancy T.

Bowen, Strategies for Defending Against Discovery Requests for Tax Returns, 122 TAx

NOTES 217 (Jan. 12, 2009) (summarizing common-law privilege to limit discovery of tax
returns in nontax civil litigation between private parties).
309 Joseph J. Thomdike, News Analysis: Show Us the Money, 123 TAX NOTES 148 (Apr.

13, 2009) (noting that taxpayers are "willing to disclose [their] returns whenever it suits
[their] private purposes").
310 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information
Increase Compliance?, 18
"vanishing commodity").
311

CAN.

J. L. &

Bowen, supra note 310, at 4.

JuRIS.

95, 101-02 (2005) (describing privacy as a
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common law informer privilege. 3 12 And information regarding the status of
a whistleblower's claim is known only to the Service.
4.

Disclosures Need Not Impose Significant Demands on the Service

Providing meaningful updates to whistleblowers about the status of
their claims and providing a copy of the information that the Service used to
make its award determination will not impose significant resource demands
on the Service. The Service knows the status of the whistleblower's claim;
it merely needs to communicate the status to the whistleblower. Moreover,
313
at the end of the examination, the Service will have an award claim file.
Providing a copy of that file to a whistleblower who appeals the award
determination involves a minimal amount of Service effort.
5.

Effect of Disclosures on Taxpayer Compliance Are Exaggerated

Tax compliance often is cited as the justification for protecting the
confidentiality of tax information. 3 14 The argument begins by recognizing
that the United States has a voluntary tax system in the sense that taxpayers
compute and self-report their tax liability to the government. In a voluntary
tax system, taxpayers are compelled to disclose sensitive, intimate, and
proprietary information to the Service so that their self-reported tax liability
can be verified. 3 15 The concern is that taxpayers will be less forthcoming if

312 I.R.S. Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253,

§ 3.06; see also Roviaro v. United States,

353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957); Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 672, 676 (1977), rev'd on
other grounds, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the informer privilege permits the
government to withhold the identity of "persons who furnish information of violation of law
to officers charged with enforcement of that law" to encourage the flow of information to the
government).
313 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
314 See, e.g., 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 143, at 21; 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra
note 143, at 326; I.R.S., DISCLOSURE & PRIVACY LAW REFERENCE GuIDE,1-7 (stating that
"there must be public confidence with respect to the confidentiality of personal and financial
information given to us for tax administration purposes"). But see Richard D. Pomp, The
Disclosure of State CorporateIncome Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22
CAP. U. L. REv. 373, 443-44 (1993) (stating the counterargument that public disclosure may
actually improve voluntary compliance).
315 S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. 1, at 316 (1976), as reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 354
(1976) (stating that "the IRS probably has more information about more people than any
other agency in this country"); 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 314 (same); PRIVACY
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 143, at 25 (stating that the Service "collects and maintains

vast amounts of information" that is warranted to ensure tax compliance, and noting the
Service's "extra-ordinary investigative powers," which are justified by "overwhelming
importance of public revenue collection"). There is a certain irony in the fact that the tax
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their tax information is used for purposes other than determining their own
3 16
tax liability.
Changes made to section 6103 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 were
motivated by questions of whether disclosure of returns and return
information for nontax purposes was a breach of taxpayers' privacy
expectations, and whether the "public's reaction to this possible abuse of
privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country's very
successful voluntary assessment system." 3 17 Yet there is no proof, other
than anecdotal observation, that protecting tax information improves
compliance. 3 18 David Joyce, in his article Raiding the Confessional-The
Use of Income Tax Returns in Nontax CriminalInvestigations, disputes the
link between voluntary compliance and confidentiality by noting that
voluntary compliance decreased after the 1976 changes to section 6103, and
system itself, which permits all sorts of deductions and credits, drives the Service's need for
so much information from taxpayers. In a simpler tax system, less disclosure by taxpayers to
the Service would be required. See Christopher S. Rizek, Taxpayer Privacy and Disclosure
Issues Will Continue to Touch Us All, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TAXATION: ESSAYS
T
COMMEMORATING THE 3 0 H ANNIVERSARY OF TAX NOTES 81, 85 (Tax Analysts 2002) (stating

that "radical simplification of the tax laws themselves might reduce compliance burdens")
(emphasis in original).
316 Confidentiality of Tax Return Information: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 94th Cong. 98 (1976) (statement of Sen. Weicker, Jr.) (stating that "taxpayers
disclose their private financial circumstances, things that they would not mention to in-laws
or friends, to their government because they understand the need for taxes, and trust their
government to keep their private lives private. Undermine that trust and you have
undermined our tax system in a fundamental way"); 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 315
(stating that section 6103 tries to balance an agency's need for information with the
"citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon the continuation of
compliance with our country's voluntary tax assessment system"); 2000 TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 143, at 34 (stating that "[t]axpayers who view the IRS as a resource for a variety
of other interests will be less inclined to voluntarily turn over sensitive financial information
out of fear of where it might ultimately land"); PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
143 at 537 (stating that tax information must be confidential "if individuals are to be induced
to participate in a government undertaking"); ADMIISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REPORT, supra
note 142, at 943 (stating that "a fully confidential system would presumably improve public
compliance with the self reporting system" and "if taxpayers knew that information reported
on tax returns could be used only for tax purposes, there would be less reason to falsify a
return where accurate information might lead to a non-tax investigation"); see also United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) (stating that the "[g]ovemment depends upon
the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information
relevant to tax liability").
317 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 143, at 314.
318 Stephen W. Mazza, Tax Compliance: Should Congress Reform the 1986 Reform
Act: Taxpayer Privacyand Tax Compliance, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1070-76 (2003); Joyce,
supra note 308, at 1267 (stating that the "promise of an ironclad prohibition against
disclosure is at best a peripheral inducement to honest reporting").
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suggesting that any correlation between voluntary compliance and
confidentiality is "merely speculative."3 19 Notwithstanding the fact that the
Service makes billions of disclosures of taxpayer information every year
under existing exceptions to section 6103, the level of voluntary compliance
that
remains quite high at 84%, which seems to undercut the argument
32 0
compliance will suffer if taxpayer information is not confidential.
Proponents who want to keep tax returns and tax information
confidential worry that voluntary compliance will decrease if the Service
discloses taxpayers' information. But there is a reasonable counterargument
whistleblower
that making disclosures as part of an effective Service
,. 321
Potentially
program may actually improve voluntary compliance.
noncompliant taxpayers may be deterred from evading their tax liabilities
and already compliant taxpayers may be encouraged to stay in compliance
by knowing that the Service is fairly322enforcing the tax laws to ensure that
everyone pays their fair share of tax.
319

Joyce, supra note 308, at 1267, 1279.

320 Rizek, supra note 317, at 90. The Service estimates the voluntary compliance rate to
be approximately 84%. 2009 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 8, at 2. The Service's goal for

fiscal 2009 is to achieve a rate of 86%. Id.at 12. In 2008, the Service made over 5.4 billion
disclosures of tax returns or return information under certain of the section 6103 exceptions,
up from 4.5 billion disclosures made during 2007. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
111TH CONG., DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION PURSUANT TO INTERNAL

REVENUE CODE SECTION 6103(P)(3)(C) FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2008 PREPARED BY THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Joint Comm. Print 2009) (disclosures made in 2008); STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION
PURSUANT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 6103(P)(3)(C) FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2007

PREPARED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Joint Comm. Press 2009) (disclosures made
in 2007); see I.R.C. § 6103(p)(3)(C) (stating the statutory requirement to report number of
disclosures for 2008).
321 Mazza, supra note 320, at 1084 (concluding that limited publicity of Service
enforcement actions "can play a positive role in maintaining and improving levels of
compliance by increasing a taxpayer's perception of his risk of detection and punishment
and by strengthening the taxpayer's internal motivation toward compliance"); see also
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1492-99 (2003).
322 Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collection Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 83 (2003) (discussing reciprocity theory which theorizes that persons
comply with the tax law if they perceive other persons also pay their taxes and will not
comply if they perceive other persons are not complying); Lederman, supra note 323, at
1492-99; Mazza, supra note 320, at 1084 (stating that selective publicity of Service
enforcement actions may improve tax compliance by "strengthening the taxpayer's internal
motivation toward compliance"); Janet Novack, Are you a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001,
at 122; Ventry, supra note 14, at 373-74 (stating that voluntary compliance may increase by
lowering privacy protections in section 6103). Some scholars argue that voluntary
compliance may be diminished by making taxpayers aware of other taxpayers'

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 29:447

Rather than rely on the promise of confidentiality to encourage
taxpayer compliance, the Service primarily relies on..third-party
withholding
323
and reporting, as well as civil and criminal sanctions.
Much of taxpayer
income is corroborated by third-party reporting. 324 Taxpayers are less likely
325
to withhold information that third-party payers will report to the Service.
Moreover, taxpayers are incentivized to completely and accurately report
their tax information to the Service to avoid penalties, interest, and other
sanctions that arise from understating their taxes. They are also incentivized
to maintain records supporting their losses and deductions. 326 These
incentives exist independently of any expectation that the taxpayers' return
information will be kept confidential.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this article has discussed, section 6103 imposes serious restrictions
that limit the potential success of the enhanced whistleblower statute.
Section 6103 as currently written prohibits the Service from updating the
whistleblower as to the status of his or her claim. Section 6103 also
prevents the Service from readily leveraging the insider knowledge of the
whistleblower. Additionally, many questions remain about the effectiveness
of the whistleblower's right to appeal the Service's determination to the Tax
Court.
Notwithstanding weaknesses in the Service whistleblower program, it
is more effective and less expensive than the Service's primary method of
selecting tax returns for audit. Congress unquestionably intended that the
2006 amendments would increase the effectiveness of the Service
whistleblower program. This increased effectiveness would be obtained by
permitting whistleblowers access to taxpayers' tax information. There are
also convincing policy reasons to amend section 6103 to permit the Service
noncompliance. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 312, at 96-98.
323 Joyce, supra note 308, at 1266-67.
324 See Rizek, supra note 317, at 84 (stating that third-party reporting "in large part
accounts for the relatively high rate of income tax compliance that the United States
enjoys").
325 See William A. Edmunson, Note, Discovery of FederalIncome Tax Returns and the
New "Qualified" Privileges, 1984 DUKE L.J. 938, 956 (1984); see also 2009 TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that "[r]eporting compliance is highest where parties
other than the taxpayer are required to file information reports and withhold taxes from
payments made"); Rizek, supra note 317, at 84.
326 Edmunson, supra note 327, at 955 (citing Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 1979)); see Steve R. Johnson, The Dangersof Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions
and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 413, 450-51 (1999)
(discussing taxpayer incentives to maintain and produce tax information).
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to disclose taxpayer information to whistleblowers. 327 Striking a fair
balance between taxpayer privacy and the Service's ability to effectively
administer the tax laws weighs in favor of making necessary disclosures of
taxpayer information to whistleblowers.
Section 6103 is intended to foster confidence in the tax system by
acting "as a shield to protect taxpayers from improper disclosure by the
government of the information they were required to provide to it by
law." 328 Instead, with respect to the Service whistleblower program, section
6103 acts as a sword for the Service to battle the whistleblower.

327

See supra Part VI. Scholars have recommended scrapping section 6103 altogether

and starting over to give the Service more discretion. See, e.g., George Guttman, The
ConfidentialityStatute Needs Rethinking, 86 TAx NoTES 318 (Feb. 7, 2000).
328 Beresford v. United States, 123 F.R.D. 232, 233 (E.D. Mich. 1988).

